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SPCL MES:

LENDERS: *MNI, EXW, EXW, TET, LSH

LHR SUMMARY: 6-(1990:05-)

TITLE: Journal of contemporary criminal justice.

ISSN: 1043-9862

IMPRINT: [Long Beach, CA] : Dept. of Criminal Justice at California State University, Long Beach

ARTICLE: Jeffrey Ian Ross: "The Relationship Between Domestic Protest and Oppositional Political

Terrorism in Connection with the Gulf Conflict,"

VOLUME: 11

ISSUE NUMBER: 1

ISSUE DATE: Feb. 1995

PAGES: 35-51

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**THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOMESTIC PROTEST
AND OPPOSITIONAL POLITICAL TERRORISM
IN CONNECTION WITH THE GULF CONFLICT**

Jeffrey Ian Ross

ABSTRACT

The author quantitatively tests eight interrelated hypotheses about the relationship between protests against the allies' participation in the Gulf War and the use of oppositional political terrorism connected to this crisis. Both visual inspection of the data and quantitative analysis supports the relationship between non-Gulf Conflict related terrorism, protest connected to the Gulf Conflict and Gulf-related terrorism. Characteristics of protests, such as number of protesters and presence of violence, however, make negligible contributions to Gulf-specific terrorism. However, these variables in combination with the number of days the coalition forces were in the Gulf account for a moderate amount of the variance. There is also a significant relationship between protest and terrorism as a function of the period of conflict. Whereas protests are high and terrorism is low in period one, the reverse is true for the last period.

This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Society of Criminology, Phoenix, October 27, 1993. The author has benefited from the research assistance of Joe Daou and helpful comments of Natasha J. Cabrera.

INTRODUCTION¹

The Persian Gulf Crisis and War, hereafter referred to as the Gulf Conflict, is one of the most complicated relatively recent events to analyze. Given the complex nature of the cultural, economic, political, and social structure of the Middle East, there are diverse issues that can be addressed in analyzing the Gulf Conflict. Perhaps the most anomalous issue connected to the Conflict was the threat and reality of oppositional political terrorism.²

Almost from the beginning of the Conflict, Saddam Hussein, as well as leaders

and representatives of various terrorist groups throughout the world, warned us that they would engage in and/or sponsor terrorist activities if the United States and its coalition, also known as allied forces, attacked Iraq or Iraq's forces in Kuwait.³ Threats of terrorism became a reality in many countries. Between 104 (Ross, 1993a) and 275 (United States, 1992) terrorist incidents, in connection with the Conflict, were carried out between August 1, 1990 (the day the Iraqi tanks rolled over the Kuwaiti border) and March 10, 1991 (the signing of the peace accord between Iraq and the coalition forces).⁴

The study of terrorism connected to the Gulf Conflict is important for four principle reasons, which are from least to most important: (a) it is a unique phenomenon, (b) rarely do states (or their allies) publicly threaten to engage in state-sponsored terrorism,⁵ (c) it allows us to test some recently formulated hypotheses connected to the structural causes of terrorism, and (d) we might be able to prevent similar acts of terrorism in the future and thereby prevent needless destruction, injuries and deaths.

Approximately twelve general research hypotheses, dealing with perpetrators and targets, can be formulated and tested in connection with the relationship between terrorism and the Gulf Conflict (Ross, 1993a).⁶ This article, however, only concerns itself with eight related hypotheses from this research effort, focusing on the relationship between political unrest and terrorism.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND OUTLINE OF RESEARCH HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED

A number of authors have articulated a series of psychological and structural factors considered to be important causes of terrorism (e.g., Crenshaw, 1984; Gross, 1972; Ross, 1993b). Few authors, however, have empirically tested the relative importance of these factors.⁷ Extrapolating from Ross' (1993b) structural model of terrorism, ten separate causes are identified including modernization level, geographical location, type of political system, presence of other forms of political unrest, historical and cultural facilitation, anti-terrorist organization failure, organizational split and development, availability of weapons and explosives, support, and grievances. One of the most easily testable of the previously outlined factors is the presence of other forms of violent or non-violent political unrest, which may legitimate the violence, and act as a catalyst for terrorism. These types of unrest include civil disobedience, protests, demonstrations (e.g., Monti, 1980), strikes, riots, guerrilla warfare, revolution, war, or other individuals' or groups' terrorist actions. Although the criminological literature has identified a relationship between international war and domestic homicide rates both cross-nationally (Archer and Gartner, 1976; 1984) and in selected countries and contexts (e.g., Fishman, 1983; Kleck, 1987; Landau and Pfefferman, 1988) as well as between capital punishment and homicide rates (Bowers and Pierce, 1980; Gartner, 1990), it is relatively silent about political crime of a violent nature.

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In general, unrest can interchangeably provide learning opportunities, increase the legitimacy of violent actions, heighten grievances, and ultimately motivate individuals and terrorist organizations to engage in terrorism. More specifically, unrest both inside and outside a state's borders may influence individuals and groups to commit terrorism (i.e., contagion). Generally, the closer, geographically, the unrest, the greater the likelihood of it being a catalyst to those predisposed to engage in terrorist events in that country. Presence of other forms of unrest is also heightened when there is a communication mechanism that relays this information (i.e., the mass media) (e.g., Midlarsky, Crenshaw, and Yoshida, 1980).⁸

It is argued that among the various forms of political unrest, those which are conflict-specific would be most predictive of terrorism (Ross, 1992). Thus, protest against American and coalition participation in the Gulf Conflict should be highly associated with terrorism associated with the Conflict.

A number of case studies examining, in whole or in part, demonstration connected to the Gulf Conflict have been written. Elbaum (1991) reviews the "grassroots-based anti-war movement" in the United States, including its membership, impetus, and impact. He also documents protests against intervention by people who had family in the military, and the refusal to serve by some of the military called up for mobilization. Cohen (1991) examines the Israeli Peace Movement's response to the Gulf Conflict, particularly in relationship to their country's treatment of Palestinians in the occupied territories/West Bank. Hamarneh (1991) discusses, in part, the Jordanian people's support of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and protest against the deployment of allied forces to the Gulf. Cierra (1991) examines the anti-war movement in Western European countries. He states that "[t]his movement ... is characterized by great diversity, corresponding to different political situations, and to each country's position in the economic, political and strategic structures of Europe" (p. 281). Finally, Rahman and Baker (1991) review the Pakistanian public's response and support for Iraq.⁹

Although providing excellent descriptive and analytical accounts of these movements, this literature does not consider the violent nature of these protests, the problem of terrorism, the development or testing of hypotheses, the creation of theory, nor does it provide quantitative analyses for such events. In an effort to correct this imbalance, this author outlines and tests a series of hypotheses connected to demonstration and terrorism.

To begin with, two types of terrorism took place during the Conflict: those acts connected to the Crisis and those independent or tangential to it. For purposes of this study, those terrorist incidents related to the Conflict were called Gulf-Related Terrorism (GRT) and served as this researcher's dependent variable.

In order to test the importance of protest, eight hypotheses were derived. First, the higher the number of protests that states experience by their own citizens against committing troops to the Gulf (PROCTOG), the greater the amount of GRT they should experience. This hypothesis assumes that individuals and groups will become frustrated with their governments' lack of attention to their policy

demands motivating the more committed to engage in terrorism or support individuals predisposed to commit this type of political and criminal violence. Thus:

Hypothesis 1: The higher the number of PROCTOG, the greater the GRT.

Second, the higher the amount of terrorism unconnected to the Gulf Conflict (NONGRT), the higher the amount of terrorism connected to the Gulf Conflict (GRT). Here NONGRT serves as a potent reminder to individuals and groups opposed to the Gulf crisis that they can resort to terrorism to reinforce their policy demands.

Hypothesis 2: The higher the NONGRT, the greater the GRT.

Third, closely connected to Hypothesis 1 and based on the assumption that demonstration alone is not as important as the nature and characteristics of the protest, the higher the intensity (I) of PROCTOG operationalized in terms of presence of violence (PREVIOLE) and number of protesters (NUOFPROT), the greater the possibility of GRT. Consequently:

Hypothesis 3: The greater the PREVIOLE, the greater the GRT.

Hypothesis 4: The greater the NUOFPROT, the greater the GRT.

Hypothesis 5: The greater the intensity (I) of PROCTOG, the greater the GRT.

Six, the previous hypotheses are probably dependent on the length of time that allied troops were stationed or active in the Gulf. That is, citizens opposed to the Conflict probably became increasingly frustrated at the foreign armed forces present in the Gulf the longer they were there. Consequently, the longer the time the troops are in the Gulf, or Time in Gulf (DAYINTO), the greater the I, and thus the possibility of GRT (Figure 1). Therefore:

Hypothesis 6: The greater the DAYINTO, the higher the I.

Seven, there is a chance that the presence of violent protest (PREVIOLE), the greater the day into the Conflict (DAYINTO), the greater the number of protesters (NUOFPROT), and the greater the number of Gulf-related protests (PROCTOG) jointly contribute to the amount of Gulf-related terrorism (GRT).

Hypothesis 7: The greater the PREVIOLE, the greater the DAYINTO, the greater the NUOFPROT, and the greater the PROCTOG, the greater the probability of GRT.

Finally, the progress of the Conflict, beyond simple number of days coalition troops were stationed in the Gulf, should have an effect on GRT. In other words the greater the threat of war, the higher the GRT. Thus, the data should be categorized into three periods: (1) when the Iraqi tanks crossed the Kuwaiti border (August 1, 1990) until the United Nations deadline demanding Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait (January 15); (2) the start of operation Desert Storm (the bombing raids) (January 16) until just before the ground war into Kuwait (February 23, 1991);¹⁰ and (3) the start of the coalition's ground war (February 24, 1991) into Kuwait and the signing of the cease-fire agreement (March 10, 1991). Thus:

Hypothesis 8: The number of PROCTOG and GRT should be greater in the last period of the Conflict.

Achieving a connection with the plethora of material perceived to be biased is not readily accessible in mind, two data sets the aforementioned from a data set built 1993),¹¹ and other variables: day, month, terrorism, country where took place, whether victim, number inju

Second, a database analyze the demonstrations Protest Connected to the same time period riots connected to the this chronology were crisis protest took place country where protest involved in protest, number arrested in pr

These data sets contribute to the signing of the cease inferential statistics hypotheses were tested

A total of 113 demonstrations in the Conflict were reported corresponds with the land campaign (see table

METHODOLOGY



Achieving a comprehensive picture of the nature of terrorism and protest in connection with the Gulf Conflict from public sources is difficult. First, there are a plethora of materials from which to choose. Second, much information is perceived to be biased. Third, and most important, the majority of source material is not readily accessible for events database construction. Keeping these cautions in mind, two data sets were constructed. These data sets were then analyzed to test the afore mentioned hypotheses. First, the dependent variable, GRT, was obtained from a data set built from the ITERATE IV (version 3) chronology (Mickolus, 1993),¹¹ and other sources.¹² This investigator coded the incidents on fourteen variables: day, month, and year into the Conflict that terrorism took place, type of terrorism, country where event occurred, country targeted, city where terrorism took place, whether terrorism was connected to the Conflict, perpetrator, type of victim, number injured, number killed, and number of protesters arrested.¹³

Second, a database was constructed and later coded as a subset of the first, to analyze the demonstration hypotheses. A compilation of protest events called Protest Connected to Gulf Crisis (PROCTOG) was prepared by this author covering the same time period as GRT. First, a chronology of demonstrations, protests, and riots connected to the Gulf Conflict, PROCTOG, was assembled.¹⁴ All incidents in this chronology were coded on twelve variables including: day, month, and year into crisis protest took place, type of demonstration, presence of violence in protest, country where protest took place, city where demonstration occurred, type of victim involved in protest, number injured in demonstration, number killed in protest, and number arrested in protest.¹⁵

These data sets cover the period from the Iraqi invasion (i.e., August 1, 1990) to the signing of the cease-fire/peace accord (i.e., March 10, 1991). Descriptive and inferential statistics were performed on the data and the previously articulated hypotheses were tested.

SELECTED RESULTS


A total of 113 demonstrations against the allied participation in the Gulf Conflict were reported by PROCTOG. The greatest concentration of demonstrations in terms of frequency, occurred during the month of January which corresponds with the coalition bombing (Desert Storm) and the beginning of the land campaign (see table 1 and figure 2).



	Protest		Terrorism	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
August	5	4.4	0	0.0
September	2	1.8	3	2.9
October	24	21.2	3	2.9
November	1	.9	2	1.9
December	3	2.7	1	1.0
January	63	55.8	55	52.9
February	15	13.3	37	35.6
March	0	0.0	3	2.9
TOTAL	113	100.0	104	100.00

TABLE 1. Month When Protest and Terrorist Events Took Place.

Protests took place in industrialized countries. Protests took place in Canada and many of the countries that did not experience terrorism explained by either the quality of the data or the quality of the data. Eleven countries in v... Terrorism. In sum, with the terrorism experienced in incidents where either countries experienced



Protests took place in a total of twenty-four countries. Although the advanced industrialized countries experienced the bulk of these protests, over half of them took place in Canada and the United States.¹⁶ More interesting is the finding that many of the countries (e.g., twenty-three, especially those making up the coalition) did not experience any protests. Lack of protests in allied countries may be explained by either the apathy of citizens, satisfaction with their country's actions, or the quality of the data (see table 4). Terrorism took place in thirty-six countries. Eleven countries in which protests took place did not experience Gulf-Related Terrorism. In sum, when the number of protests in each country is compared with the terrorism experienced by that country we discover that out of a total of forty-six incidents where either terrorism and/or demonstrations occurred, only thirteen countries experienced both terrorism and protest.

42 The Relationship Between Domestic Protest and Oppositional Political Terrorism in Connection with the Gulf Conflict

Country where incident took place	Protest		Terrorism	
	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent
Turkey	1	.9	11	10.6
Chile	0	.0	10	9.6
Peru	0	.0	9	8.7
Philippines	0	.0	9	8.7
Germany	7	6.2	7	6.7
Egypt	2	1.8	5	4.8
Lebanon	0	.0	5	4.8
Iran	0	.0	4	3.8
Italy	2	1.8	3	2.9
Jordan	6	5.3	3	2.9
Yemen	1	.9	3	2.9
USA	37	32.7	3	2.9
Australia	0	.0	2	1.9
Colombia	0	.0	2	1.9
France	5	4.4	2	1.9
Greece	0	.0	2	1.9
Nigeria	0	.0	2	1.9
Thailand	0	.0	2	1.9
Tunisia	2	1.8	2	1.9
Venezuela	0	.0	2	1.9
Algeria	0	.0	1	1.0
Bolivia	0	.0	1	1.0
Brazil	0	.0	1	1.0
Cyprus	0	.0	1	1.0
Dubai	0	.0	1	1.0
Guatemala	0	.0	1	1.0
Haiti	0	.0	1	1.0
Hungary	0	.0	1	1.0
Iraq	2	1.8	1	1.0
Morocco	1	.9	1	1.0
Netherlands	0	.0	1	1.0
Puerto Rico	0	.0	1	1.0
Saudi Arabia	0	.0	1	1.0
Spain	1	.9	1	1.0
Sweden	1	.9	1	1.0
Uganda	0	.0	1	1.0
Bangladesh	1	.9	0	.0
Canada	30	26.5	0	.0
Israel	2	1.8	0	.0
India	1	.9	0	.0
Japan	1	.9	0	.0
Libya	1	.9	0	.0
Norway	1	.9	0	.0
Panama	1	.9	0	.0
Pakistan	3	2.7	0	.0
United Kingdom	3	2.7	0	.0
Missing	1	.9	0	.0
TOTAL	113	100.00	104	100.00

TABLE 2. State Where Protest and Terrorism Occurred

For the majority unable to determine 11.5 % (13) involve people were injured, either authorities or protesters were killed was 500 in two separ

For approximat demonstration was mi with the highest rea protesters per demons pull-out deadline app campaign neared (see

For the majority of protests across the countries, 84.1 % (95), the researcher was unable to determine if they were violent or not (of the remaining 15.9 % (18), only 11.5 % (13) involved violence and 4.4 % (5) were nonviolent). In cases where people were injured, it was mainly the protesters with no injurious consequences to either authorities or passersby. Pakistan was the only country where three pro-Iraqi protesters were killed. In terms of arrests, the largest number of people apprehended was 500 in two separate events which took place in Canada.

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	13	11.5
No	5	4.4
Unknown	95	84.1
TOTAL	113	100.0

TABLE 3. Presence of Violence In Protest

For approximately half of the protests, the number of protesters per demonstration was missing. Nevertheless, the median number of protests was 3,000 with the highest reaching 300,000 for one protest. In general, the number of protesters per demonstration increased as the United Nations mandated January 15 pull-out deadline approached and even more so as the date of the start of the land campaign neared (see table 4).

Size of Crowd	Frequency	Percent
1[*]	1	0.9
40	1	0.9
50	1	0.9
100	4	3.5
125	1	0.9
200	2	1.8
300	4	3.5
400	1	0.9
500	1	0.9
700	1	0.9
1000	7	6.2
2000	1	0.9
3000	9	8
4000	1	0.9
5000	1	0.9
8000	1	0.9
10000	2	1.8
15000	2	1.8
20000	1	0.9
40000	1	0.9
50000	1	0.9
127000	1	0.9
137500	1	0.9
150000	1	0.9
300000	1	0.9
Missing	65	57.5
TOTAL	113	100

TABLE 4. Number of Protesters Who Attended Demonstration

Table 5 shows simple correlations for the previously articulated hypotheses 1 through 6. There is a significant perfect negative relationship between PROCTOG and GRT; the relationship between NONGRT and GRT is a negative and significant $r = -.56, p < .0001$. Hypotheses 3 to 6 are not significant, $p > .05$.

Hypothesis

1. Relationship between PROCTOG and GRT

2. Relationship between NONGRT and GRT

3. Relationship between PREVIOLE and GRT

4. Relationship between NUOFFPRO and GRT

5. Relationship between I (NUOFFPRO + PREVIOLE) and GRT

6. Relationship between DAYINTO and GRT

*nonsignificant at $p > .05$

TABLE 5. Pearson

To determine if the relationship between DAYINTO (day of demonstration) and GRT (number of protesters) regression was computed. The dependent variable was GRT. The independent variable was DAYINTO. The analysis due to multicollinearity was not conducted. Table 6 shows the results of the simple linear relationship, $r = .56, p < .0001$.

Only one of the independent variables was used in the prediction of GRT. The prediction of GRT was based on the number of protesters and the day of demonstration.

Hypothesis	r	p
1. Relationship between PROCTOG and GRT	-1.00	.0001
2. Relationship between NONGRT and GRT	-.56	.0001
3. Relationship between PREVIOLE and GRT	-.14	*.74
4. Relationship between NUOFFPROT and GRT	-.05	*.74
5. Relationship between I (NUOFFPROT + PREVIOLE) and GRT	-.21	*.62
6. Relationship between DAYINTO and I	.42	*.30

*nonsignificant at $p > .05$.

TABLE 5. Pearson Product-Moment Correlations for Hypotheses 1 to 6

To determine if there is a relationship among VIOLENCE (violent protests), DAYINTO (day of Conflict), and NUOFFPROT (number of protesters), a multiple regression was computed with GRT (number of Gulf-related terrorist incidents) as the dependent variable (hypothesis 7). PROCTOG, however, was omitted from the analysis due to multicollinearity. The variables were forced into the equation. Table 6 shows the results of this analysis. Results suggested that there was a significant linear relationship, $r = .37$, $F(3, 213) = 11.56$, $p < .0001$.

Only one of the independent variables, DAYINTO, contributes significantly to the prediction of GRT with $Sr^2 = .12$, $F(3, 213) = 29.58$, $p < .0001$. The contributions of number protesters and violent protests are nonsignificant. The three independent

variables in combination contributed only .01 in shared variability. Altogether, 14% (13% adjusted) of the variability in number of GRT was predicted by knowing the scores on these three variables.

Variables	GRT	VIOLENCE	DAYINTO	NUOFFPROT	B	Beta	Sr2 (unique)
VIOLENCE	-0.4	-	-0.09	-0.09	-0.22	-0.06	0.01
DAYINTO	0.35	-0.09	-	-0.12	0	0.35	0.12
NUOFFPROT	-0.01	-0.09	0.12	-	-1.17	-0.06	0
				Intercept	-1.57		
Means	0.48	0.0	8189.73	19037.06			
StdD	0.5	0.27	49.08	25023.49			
						R2=.14a	
						Adjusted R2=.13	

a Unique variability = .13, shares variability = .01

TABLE 6. Standard Multiple Regression of Violent Protests, Day into Conflict, and Number of Protestors on the Number of Gulf-related Terrorist Incidents

To test the relationship between periods of Conflict and GRT (hypothesis 8), a Chi-square analysis was performed. The results suggest that there is an association between periods (3) and type of political behavior (i.e., PROCTOG and GRT), Chi-square (2) = 49.18, $p < .005$. In the first period (Aug. 1 - Jan. 15), there was more PROCTOG (29%) than GRT (9%). This relationship was reversed for the third period (Feb. 24 - March 10), in which there was more GRT (63%) than PROCTOG (17%). In the second period (Jan. 16 - Feb. 23), there was also more PROCTOG (54%) than GRT (29%). This period had also more GRT and PROCTOG than period 1 (9% and 29%, respectively). In the main, the majority of GRT occurred in the third period, but more than half (54%) of PROCTOG took place in the second period. Thus the decline of PROCTOG toward the end of the Conflict is accompanied by an increase in GRT during this same period.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In general, Gulf Conflict-related protests (PROCTOG) and non-Gulf-related terrorism (NONGRT) are related to Gulf-related Terrorism (GRT). In other words, the presence of other types of political unrest are related to terrorism. The weaker relationship is between NONGRT and GRT ($r = -.56$), which partially supports a contagion effect. Thus the initial hypothesis which motivated this research is supported. Moreover, the number of GRT events is moderately predicted by DAYINTO, NUOFFPROT, and VIOLENCE. However, by themselves these

variables are not significant.

At first glance PROCTOG and GRT relationship between periods of the Conflict period and peaked in other words, during terrorism was low, by incidents of protest b

Since the results of political unrest su Gulf-specific terrorism relationships among warfare, etc.), includ structural causal vari performed the causal remain an elusive phe

1. See Ross (1993b)
2. The researcher us example, Ross (1991) references to terrorism terrorism.
3. See, for example "Attacks for Iraq," New Raises its Guard Against 17, 1990, p. A12; Glob for example, Edward M suggested that the thre to Western cities was
4. According to the sporadic, uncoordinated in deaths, significant incidents, resulting on number of international half the incidents in 19 Desert Storm was un incidents dropped shar
5. Most states that responsibility.

variables are not significantly related to GRT.

At first glance, the finding of a perfect negative correlation between PROCTOG and GRT is counterintuitive. However, when we look at the relationship between PROCTOG and GRT categorized into three of the dominant periods of the Conflict the relationship becomes clear. While GRT increased in each period and peaked in the third, PROCTOG was highest only in middle period. In other words, during the first period of the crisis demonstration was high and terrorism was low, by the 3rd period, the reverse was true, that is, there were less incidents of protest but considerably more incidents of GRT.

Since the results of this study suggest that, at least in the Gulf Conflict, types of political unrest such as protests and non-Gulf-related terrorism are related to Gulf-specific terrorism, a useful avenue of future research might be to explore the relationships among other forms of political unrest (e.g., strikes, riots, guerrilla warfare, etc.), including protests and non-specific context terrorism, and other structural causal variables and context-specific terrorism. Until this type of work is performed the causal relationships underlying oppositional political terrorism will remain an elusive phenomenon.

NOTES

1. See Ross (1993b) for an introduction to this research agenda.
2. The researcher uses a modified version of Schmid's definition (1983). See, for example, Ross (1991) for an example of this modification. Additionally, all future references to terrorism should be interpreted to refer to oppositional political terrorism.
3. See, for example, Joel Brinkley, "Israelis Assert Palestinians Plan Terror Attacks for Iraq," *New York Times*, August 18, 1990, p. 5; Alan Cowell, "Egypt Raises its Guard Against Iraqi Terrorism," *New York Times*, Monday September 17, 1990, p. A12; *Globe and Mail*, January 15, 1991, p. A7. On the other hand, see, for example, Edward N. Lutwak, *New York Times*, January 13, 1991, IV, 19:1, who suggested that the threat of terrorism to U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf, to Israel and to Western cities was exaggerated.
4. According to the State Department (1992), "Most of these attacks ... were sporadic, uncoordinated, and low-level incidents. Only a small percentage resulted in deaths, significant injuries, or property damage" (p. 1). They "were minor incidents, resulting only in property damage. War-related attacks brought the total number of international terrorist incidents in 1991 to 557, up from 456 in 1990. Fully half the incidents in 1991 occurred during January and February, while Operation Desert Storm was underway. After the war, however, the number of terrorist incidents dropped sharply and actually fell below 1990 levels" (p. 1).
5. Most states that engage in state-sponsored terrorism like to conceal their responsibility.

6. These hypotheses build upon those outlined by Bueno De Mesquita (1981); Levy (1981); Organski and Kugler (1980); Starr and Most (1976; 1978) in their quantitative research on war.
7. See, for example, Hamilton (1978) for an exception.
8. Other forms of political unrest can also heighten grievances and lead to organizational splits and development which have also been identified as causes of terrorism.
9. For a more general analysis of protest amongst Islamic Fundamentalist groups in the Middle East see Piscatori (1992).
10. For chronologies of the events see, for example, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 20, 202-232; and Appendices in Darwish and Alexander (1990); and Bulloch and Morris (1991).
11. A widely recognized data set which lists acts of international terrorism throughout the world. See, however, Ross (1988) for a criticism of the ITERATE data sets. See Ross (1993c) for a review of ITERATE IV. GRT was identified through such things as letters written to authorities or reliable sources, past history of a group to support Iraq, nature of the target and the nature of the perpetrator.
12. The State Department does not provide detailed chronologies of terrorist events to the public nor academic researchers.
13. Of the 487 acts of terrorism that took place during this time period, 44.6% (217) were linked to the Gulf Crisis, 34.3% (167) were not, and in 21.1% (103) of the cases it was not possible to distinguish the connection. Further iterations could test six months before and six months after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
14. These included New York Times Index (August 1990-March 1991), Times of London Index (August 1990-March 1991), Canadian News Index (August, 1990-March 1991), and *Journal of Palestine Studies*. Given that close to 75 subdivisions are listed under the term "demonstrations" in the New York Times Index, this researcher turned to the classification called Middle East instead and found most of the citations there. The Times of London did not list one single "demonstration" connected to the Gulf. And the Canadian News Index, on the other hand, catalogued demonstrations under demonstrations. Demonstrations of military personnel opposed to the allied presence in the Gulf and those supportive of the presence of foreign troops were excluded. For a general outline of the methodology for this type of events data analysis, see, for example, Ross (1988b).
15. As PROCTOG is dependent on newspaper coverage, it suffers from the same general problems for which these type of data sets are criticized. Thus a considerable amount of information may very well be missing. For example, noticeably absent was information on the fate of protesters, counter-demonstrators, and the police, who sometimes intervened.
16. Jordan was not opposed to Iraq's invasion.

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