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Attributes of Domestic Political Terrorism in Canada, 1960–1985

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Abstract *The author presents the methodology and selected results from his original chronology and data set on Canadian terrorist events. The data base covers the years 1960–1985, includes almost 500 separate events, is coded on forty variables, and is more detailed, rigorous, and comprehensive than other compilations. The domestic events were analyzed in order to determine their frequency, nature, severity, scope, range, and intensity. Analyses of selected variables of this data set are presented in this article.*

Introduction

Over the last two-and-a-half decades there has been an increasing number of studies of political terrorism in advanced industrial democracies. Unquestionably, the majority of studies on terrorism have tended to be descriptive and normative, have conceptual and methodological problems, and are marked by theoretical generalizations without any basis in empirical data.[1] With few exceptions, there is a paucity of quantitative or event data studies of political terrorism in these countries.[2]

This situation, among other problems, prevents adequate testing of theories, in a field of study that is relatively theory-barren. Additionally, the very few statistical analyses of terrorism generally focus on either international or transnational terrorist events, while other types of terrorism (e.g., interstate, state, or domestic) have been seriously underrepresented.[3] Specifically, there have been very few data-based analyses of domestic terrorism aside from a few studies of European countries and the United States.[4] Very few studies analyze political terrorism in Canada, in part because Canada has had limited experience with terrorism compared to other forms of political conflict.[5]

Partly in an attempt to remedy this state of affairs, partly because of a concern among Canadian politicians, policymakers, and national security agencies about the past, present, and future impact of terrorism on Canada, and largely as a result of the author's familiarity with Canada, he has developed an original chronology and data set on Canadian terrorist events that is more detailed, rigorous, and comprehensive than other compilations.

The project, titled Attributes of Terrorism in Canada (ATIC), is divided into three stages of data collection and analysis and based on three types of terrorism: domestic (ATIC I), international (including transnational) (ATIC II),[6] and state (ATIC III).[7] The data base, which covers the years 1960–1985, includes almost 500 separate events and is

coded on forty variables. Roughly 85 percent (415) of the events are domestic (ATIC I), and 15 percent (71) (ATIC II) are international. Because domestic events clearly outweigh the number of international and state terrorist events, they were analyzed first in order to determine their frequency, nature, severity, scope, range, and intensity. The most notable finding was a downward trend in domestic terrorism since the early 1970s. In summary, this project is a step in the direction of more reliable data, interpretation, and analysis of the pattern and trends of terrorism in Canada.

This article briefly reviews the conceptual and methodological problems with creating a data base on political terrorism in Canada, presents the methodology for collecting data, and summarizes some of the more important results from this data set. It also should serve as a model for researchers who want to construct terrorism data sets for other countries and eras.

In October 1970 Canada was cast into the international spotlight. This bilingual country, which often serves the role of peacekeeper in international conflicts, was suddenly perceived by the rest of the world to be no longer immune from international terrorism. This perception could hardly be an accurate representation of the Canadian state of affairs or the role of political violence in Canada. Terrorism was not new to Canada. In fact, acts of terrorism can be traced back to colonial times and are as recent as the Air India tragedy. More important, terrorism has been prevalent in varying degrees of frequency over the last three decades. These events, in part, led to the Senate of Canada's "Special Committee on Terrorism and the Public Safety" in 1986–1987.[8]

The history of terrorism in Canada is largely unwritten. What we see, however, is a series of isolated incidents usually committed in the course of other forms of political violence, including riots, protests, rebellions, and strike-related situations. Some of the more salient terrorist attacks include, after the arrival of the Europeans, attacks by whites on natives and vice versa (e.g., Iroquois violence against the Jesuits).[9]

In 1868, after the Confederation of Canada (1867), Member of Parliament D'Arcy McGee was assassinated by the Fenians separatists. During the anticonscription riots in 1917, a plot was uncovered to dynamite the house of the owner of the pro-conscription *Montreal Star* and a subsequent conspiracy to assassinate Prime Minister Borden and other government leaders.

Terrorist actions of the Sons of Freedom Doukhobors began in 1923 with the burning of nine school houses.[10] This type of violence persisted throughout the pre- and post-World War II period. But during the 1960s there was an increase in Sons of Freedom terrorism and the beginning of Quebecois separatist violence, mainly conducted by the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ).[11]

The study of political terrorism in general and in Canada in particular presents a number of conceptual and methodological problems. While this state of affairs has been outlined elsewhere,[12] it is useful to understand some of the more important aspects of these two problems.

Conceptual Issues

For purposes of this article, a definition of terrorism and an acceptable typology is offered. Some conceptual questions about the nature of terrorism must be resolved at the outset. A considerable debate exists about the proper definition of terrorism.[13] After an exhaustive analysis of more than 100 expert definitions, Schmid concludes that there is

no "true or correct definition."[14] Nevertheless, he outlines twenty-two elements of definitions and ostensibly develops a consensus definition consisting of five parts. First, terrorism is a method of combat in which random or symbolic victims are targets of violence. Second, through previous use of violence or the credible threat of violence, other members of that group or class are put in a state of chronic fear. Third, the victimization of the target is considered extranormal by most observers, which, fourth, creates an audience beyond the target of terror. Fifth, the purpose of terrorism is either to immobilize the target of terror in order to produce disorientation and/or compliance, or to mobilize secondary targets of demands (e.g., government) or targets of attention (e.g., public opinion).[15] This definition encompasses terrorism by governments, by oppositions, and by international movements.

With two qualifications, this conceptualization of terrorism suits the present author's purposes. First, not all five elements must demonstratively be present for an event or campaign to be labeled terrorism. In particular, the observer seldom knows for certain whether a larger audience is in fact put in fear by random or symbolic violence. It also is sometimes a matter of supposition that the perpetrators seek "to produce disorientation and/or compliance." As a practical matter, the analyst usually must infer intent and psychological effects from the nature of actions, targets, and what is known about or claimed by the perpetrator. Second, Schmid's definition neglects acts of symbolic violence against property. While he "concedes that some violence against symbolic things can be considered terroristic," he sees this as exceptional; "therefore it needs not to be included." In fact, such attacks are not exceptional. Thus, violent attacks on symbolic material targets which have the other essential traits and objects are also considered to be terroristic.

While Schmid's definition is certainly an improvement on most definitions, this definition is a little narrow, as it neglects nonhuman terroristic victimization (e.g., destruction of property and sabotage). Schmid "concedes that some violence against symbolic things can be considered terroristic," but he sees this as an exception to the rule. Just because it is an exception does not mean that it is insignificant. The author contends that terrorism also includes nonhuman targets.

This definition helps distinguish the action from the group in whose name it is carried out. That is to say, a person who commits a terrorist action is a terrorist, but people like him or her who are from the same group (race, class, nation, etc.) are not terrorists unless they engage in terrorist tactics.

The study of terrorism can be further sharpened by delineating different types. Like the definition of terrorism itself, several typologies have been introduced in the academic literature to classify terrorist actions.[16] One of the most popular and useful is the typology developed by Mickolus, which the author accepts for his purposes. Mickolus distinguishes four types of political terrorism based on whether an event involves (a) government control or direction and (b) direct involvement of nationals of more than one state. Mickolus thus identifies four types of terrorism: interstate, international, state, and domestic.[17]

First, *interstate terrorism,* also known as state-sponsored terrorism or surrogate warfare, is carried out by individuals or groups controlled by a state, involving nationals of more than one country. An example of this type of terrorism occurred when the U.S. government sent Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) backed Green Berets into Cambodia to assassinate political officials. Second, *international terrorism* is carried out by autonomous non-state actors, affecting nationals of at least two states. This type of terrorism

would include, for example, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) assassinating the Israeli ambassador in Paris.[18] Third, *state terrorism* is confined to terrorist actions conducted by a government within its national borders. This type of terrorism includes the death squads which have operated recently in El Salvador and Guatemala. And finally, *domestic terrorism* is carried on by autonomous non-state actors, in their country of origin, against domestic targets. None of these types, however, are mutually exclusive in practice. Terrorist groups operating in a country may take part in both domestic and international terrorism (e.g., the FLQ kidnapping of James Cross, the British Trade Commissioner in Montreal). All types of terrorism identified by Mickolus have occurred in Canada: state,[19] international,[20] interstate,[21] and domestic.[22] For purposes of this study, however, international and interstate incidents are combined.

Methodological Issues

There are several methodologies for empirically analyzing terrorism.[23] Events data on terrorist groups and state actions are probably the most useful in mapping broad trends and patterns, as well as in testing macro-theories about terrorism or conflict behavior.[24] They allow us to focus on the terrorist behavior itself, using the discrete incident as the unit of analysis, rather than statements by observers and practitioners. These are also the most prevalent type of data on terrorism.

Events data have been criticized for a number of reasons: their reliability and validity have been challenged;[25] very little policy analysis has been undertaken using events data;[26] and most events data research is decidedly atheoretical. Moreover, concern for measuring behavior along a conflict-cooperation continuum is the modal substantive emphasis in most research reported to date, though it is not clear why a conflict-cooperation dimension is so singularly important for theory development in policy-oriented studies. Nonetheless, there are ways of enhancing the reliability and validity of events data, as this study demonstrates. The identification of trends and patterns is an invitation to theoretical explanation, as the author demonstrates in another paper.[27]

There are three prior studies which analyze statistical data on terrorism in Canada: Mitchell,[28] Kellett,[29] and Charters.[30] Mitchell examined the incidence of politically-motivated insurgent terrorism in North America from 1968 to 1983 and the resultant policy and organization responses of the U.S. and Canadian governments. He noted the lack of data on terrorism on Canada but did not actually collect any for his study. Instead he relied on data from the Rand Corporation, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the CIA.

The most detailed study of terrorism affecting Canada which actually involved data collection is Kellett's. The report focused specifically on some trends in international terrorism, emphasizing the period 1968–1979, and assessed potential developments. It included a chronology of international terrorist events affecting Canada and concluded that Canada has experienced and will probably continue to experience a relatively low level of international terrorism.

This report is a useful beginning but has several drawbacks. First, the information is dated: numerous terrorist events have occurred in Canada since 1981. Second, events which are either not specifically terorrist in nature (e.g., threats, hoaxes, capture) or are not confirmed as terrorist events are included in the chronology of events. Third and most important, the report is limited to international terrorism, whereas—as is shown below—most terrorist incidents in Canada have been domestic.

Charters reviewed the publicly available information on Canada's experience as an espionage and terrorism "target" since 1945. He collected data on international terrorism because he felt it had been Canada's "most persistent problem" and domestic terrorism had not.[31] Charters' operational definition of terrorism is too broad. He also erred in contending that domestic terrorism is not as pervasive as international terrorism. Most terrorism in Canada since 1960 has been carried out by domestic groups aimed at domestic targets.[32] Charters' chronology of international terrorism suffers from most of the problems of Kellett's study, because it is largely based on Kellett's and on newspaper articles retrieved from the InfoGlobe data base. Finally, the chronology includes a "success" factor for each event which is not defined, thus potentially confusing any interpretation that one might derive from it.

Undoubtedly, the serious investigation of political conflict in Canada is hampered by the absence of a comprehensive and detailed national data set based on indigenous sources.

Methodology

The demanding process of developing a new data set was divided into three major stages: chronology, variable selection, and coding.[33]

Chronology

To construct a chronology of terrorist incidents in Canada, a number of issues had to be settled. These included a definition of terrorism, specification of information to be included, and identification of sources. The identification of terrorist events was based on Schmid's general definition of political terrorism introduced at the beginning of this article. Public agencies were initially contacted. Neither the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), nor the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), nor the Department of National Defense (DND), the national security agencies responsible for investigating and combating acts of terrorism, publish statistics or a chronology of events. Nor do metropolitan or provincial police forces.[34]

The larger terrorist events data collections also were consulted.[35] Six publicly available repositories of information on terrorism are relevant to Canada: the Rand Corporation data set, the Risks International "Terrorism Data Base," the ITERATE (International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events) data base originally developed by Edward Mickolus, the CIA "Tabulations of International Incidents" published through 1980, and the annual survey of transnational events published by the U.S. State Department's Office for Combatting Terrorism.[36] The obvious problem is that these data sets are limited to international events.

These data bases or chronologies also suffer from other drawbacks: their definitions of terrorism are sometimes too broad or imprecise; the information is dated or limited to a short time span; country statistics are not separated but combined under regional totals; and events which are not purely terrorist or are unconfirmed are included. Moreover, the data collectors seldom have the funds or the means to use multiple or indigenous sources or to provide chronologies and detailed summaries of the events so that other researchers can assess the validity of the events or coding procedures. *A priori* policy considerations

also limit these data collections to a few variables—they may, for example, be set up to assess the risks of or examine the responses to terrorism.[37]

Alternatively, one can rely on data from newspapers. Unfortunately, a printed news index comparable to *The New York Times Index* or a computer-readable index of a variety of newspapers such as the "National Newspaper Index" has not existed in Canada until relatively recently. In 1977, both InfoGlobe, a computer-readable data base of the *The Globe and Mail,* Canada's most widely respected national newspaper, and the *Canadian News Index*, an index of articles appearing in seven Canadian newspapers, were created. Previously, Canadian researchers had to use either vertical files produced by libraries or to read through each issue of a particular newspaper, either in hard copy or on microfilm, until they found what they wanted.

The first method was very unreliable, as it depended on the selection criteria of librarians, who are not as sensitive at selecting articles on terrorist events as are trained researchers/coders. The second method was costly in time and money. While InfoGlobe and the *News Index* speed up searching for articles, event data collections are sharply attenuated by reliance on a single source, as other events data researchers have adequately demonstrated.[38] Moreover, reliance on either the *Canadian News Index* or InfoGlobe limits the reseacher's time frame to events after 1977, thus excluding the bulk of the terrorist campaigns of Quebec separatists and the Sons of Freedom Doukhobors, the groups responsible for the majority of terrorism in Canada.[39] The period 1960–1985 was chosen in order to include the beginning of the FLQ campaign and to allow serious empirical investigation of both longer trends and short-term fluctuations.[40]

There also are problems with relying solely on the mass media, whose coverage is often hampered by inaccuracies due to journalists' working conditions, selective reporting because of editorial limitations or decisions (e.g., all the news that fits, we print), the invention of news by journalists (e.g., the Pulitzer prize-winning journalist of the *Washington Post* who invented a story of a ten-year-old boy who was addicted to heroin), and the planting of news by secret services on terrorist actions which did not occur.[41]

Thus, to construct an accurate picture of terrorism in Canada since 1960, multiple sources and cross-validation are needed. Initial listings of events were obtained in an iterative fashion from five major types of sources: data bases, chronologies, printed news indexes, case studies of terrorist organizations, and autobiographies of terrorists who have operated in Canada. Once a reference was located in a secondary source, then primary sources (newspapers) were searched for additional information. If a story was written by Canadian Press, a wire service which rewrites stories originating from other newspapers, it was ignored even though it appeared in another paper. Moreover, if while looking for one event in a newspaper, another was found that was previously unidentified, it was also included.

Once an event was located, a detailed summary was added to the chronology. This resulted in a mini case study. When there was a discrepancy in the information reported (e.g., numbers of people injured), it was noted. To increase reliability, three references were required for inclusion of an incident in the data base. One of the references had to be a primary source: a newspaper article from the city where the event occurred. If these criteria were not fulfilled, then the event was not included in the data set.

Regardless of whether or not an index, chronology, or data set is used for initial consultation, it takes a great deal of time to search for appropriate articles, compile an accurate picture of an event, code the information, and then enter it on a computer. All the information for each event is rarely located in one source, thus making it necessary to consult several sources and several issues to gain a composite picture.

Variable Selection

The literature on terrorism was surveyed to identify which variables theorists find crucial in describing, explaining, and predicting terrorist activities, and an initial set of twenty-nine variables/coding categories was specified. Special attention was given to the variables that would address scope, intensity, and range. *Scope* addresses how widespread domestic political terrorism is. *Intensity* refers to the frequency of occurrence, seriousness, destructiveness, and political impact of each type of violation at a given time. And *range* signifies the variety of tactics, issues, or groups that use political terrorism. The variables were organized into three categories: incident characteristics, terrorist characteristics, and target and victim characteristics and losses.[42]

An initial coding form based on the twenty-nine variables was created. This form was ultimately based on those developed by Gurr for his Civil Strife data base and Mickolus for his ITERATE data base.[43]

Nominal scaling was used for most variables. Nominal scaling consists of classifying or sorting events into categories which are homogeneous. Numbers are arbitrarily associated with each category: the function of number in this scheme is merely that of naming the value.

Coding Data

After the chronology was completed, the coding process began. A code book indicating how variables and values were to be coded in the study was then constructed from the original coding sheet and modified when questions about coding arose.

Two important points about the coding procedure should be noted. First, what constitutes a separate event affects one's collection and analysis of data. For example, RAND's first chronology viewed a wave of forty bombings by one group during one night in the same city as one incident, whereas ITERATE logged forty incidents.[44] This can lead to unnecessary inflation or overestimation of the amount of terrorism. To avoid multiple coding in ATIC the following procedure was followed: if, for example, more than one bomb was placed by a group on the same night at different locations, each was counted as a separate event. If the bombs were placed by the same group on the same night at the *same location* (i.e. buildings, cars) they were treated as the same event.

Second, since threats and hoaxes are almost surely underreported in the media and usually are not prepetrated by terrorist groups, they were not coded. Additionally, an explosive device which was not connected to a detonator was considered a threat or a hoax, not a bomb.

The coding sheet was typed into a computer file using the Data Entry form creation file (DENTRY) of the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSSpc+) computer program. The DENTRY program allows the coder to move back and forth between the coding form and the data, while coding events. This flexibility permitted the coder to open up new variables and values that he did not previously consider. Consequently, the coding categories were expanded to a set of forty variables.

Selected Trends and Patterns in Canadian Terrorism, 1960–1985

Eight facets of trends and patterns of terrorism in Canada are explored in this article.[45] The first five, the incident characteristics, refer to the timing, type, location, and targets of terrorist events.

Annual Incidence of Events

Almost 500 political terrorist events occurred in Canada from 1960 to 1985. Roughly 85 percent (415) of the events were domestic, and 15 percent (71) were international. The domestic events, which are the subject of this analysis, occurred in three waves. Canada experienced a relatively low level of domestic terrorism during the early sixties. The first wave, as evident in Table 1 and Figure 1, peaked in 1961 and consisted mainly of acts perpetrated by the Sons of Freedom Doukhobors. The early 1960s also saw the early manifestations of separatist-related terrorism with a lesser peak in 1963 and a much greater one in 1968. By 1973, however, terrorism by the FLQ and other Quebec ex-

Table 1
Frequency of Events Per Year

Year	Quebec Separatists[a]	Sons of Freedom Doukhobors[b]	Other Groups[c]	Total[d]	Percent
60		6		6	1.5
61		39	2	41	9.9
62		34		34	8.2
63	22	1	2	25	6.0
64	6	2	3	11	2.7
65	8	1	6	15	3.6
66	3		2	5	1.2
67	3		4	7	1.7
68	38		13	51	12.3
69	34		16	40	9.6
70	30	6	6	42	10.1
71	19	2	15	36	8.7
72	2	3	2	7	1.7
73		4	1	5	1.2
74			3	3	.7
75		3		3	.7
76		2		2	.5
77		1	3	4	1.0
78		4	1	5	1.2
79		4	1	5	1.2
80	1	4	6	11	2.7
81		7	18	25	6.0
82		3	7	10	2.4
83			15	15	3.6
84		2	1	3	.7
85		2	1	3	.7
Total	166	130	119	415	100.0

[a] Based on events that were either claimed by the organization or reliably attributed to them.
[b] Based on events that were either claimed by the organization or reliably attributed to them.
[c] Based on events that were either claimed by the organization or reliably attributed to them minus total number of actions.
[d] Based on claimed, reliably attributed, and inferred actions.

tremist groups had abated. Periodic but low-level activity by right-wing groups took place during the mid 1970s, followed by a minor upsurge in anarchist/left-wing terrorism at the end of the 1970s and into the 1980s. The year when the greatest number of terrorist actions took place was 1968. An average of 16.8 events took place each year.

Periodicity of Events

Annual trends are not of much aid to security forces attempting to allocate manpower. Are there periods during which we might expect a higher probability of attack—a time in which security forces should consider strengthening physical and human protective systems?

We find in Table 2 a clustering of events in the May–June period, with those months ranking ahead of all others. This might reflect a "school's out" mentality or "the beginning of the long, hot summer" hypothesis. This is not surprising, considering the inclement weather of Canada, which forces people to remain inside during the winter months. It is also likely that much of this clustering is a coincidental result of multiple coordinated operations (e.g., mailings of scores of letter bombs in a given month, commemoration of specific events, e.g., St.-Jean-Baptiste Day (roughly June 24) or Victoria Day (fourth Monday in May roughly May 21–23)).

There is also a less pronounced clustering of domestic events at the beginning and end of the month. See Table 3. If the 390 precisely dated events were randomly distributed, twelve or thirteen should have happened on any given day. In fact, nineteen events occurred on each of the first two days of the month, twenty-two on the 30th, and sixteen on the 31st (only seven months have a 31st day). It is tempting to infer that some terrorists work to a quota system, like policemen issuing tickets, or that the symbolism of the turning of the month suggests that it is time for a symbolic reminder to the public of their cause. This might also be explained by coordinated attacks (e.g., a series of bombings on same night).



Figure 1. Domestic Terrorism in Canada, 1960-1985

Table 2
Month Event Started

Month	Frequency	Percent
January	31	7.5
February	31	7.5
March	23	5.6
April	30	7.3
May	55	13.3
June	46	11.1
July	43	10.4
August	22	5.3
September	29	7.0
October	32	7.7
November	38	9.2
December	30	7.3
Missing data	3	.7
Total	415	100.0

Type of Event

The majority of events were low-level actions which require very little planning. Bombings account for 77 percent of all events. Since most bombs are easy to make and bombing attacks easy to carry out, this pattern is scarcely surprising. This pattern is consistent with the world-wide preponderance of bombings in international attacks. This may be due to a number of factors: the required materials for making bombs are relatively easy to obtain; some knowledge of at least primitive explosives is widespread; the risks of detection are small compared with other types of terrorist operations; and little organization is needed to attack the targets. Arson attacks are the second most favored form of terrorism. Attacks on human targets, such as assassinations or murders, are very rare. Interestingly enough, there has been very little evidence of domestic events requiring more sophisitication (e.g., skill, access to equipment and logistic support, planning, personnel, intelligence, and timing) and confrontation with the authorities such as skyjacking, nuclear-related attacks, chemical or biological attacks, or the takeover of other means of transportation. See Table 4.

Locale

In descending order of frequency the provinces of Quebec, British Columbia, and Ontario experienced the bulk of terrorist attacks. Unsurprisingly, events occur where the major domestic terrorist groups originate and roughly where the majority of Canadians live. See Table 5. What is also significant is that a number of provinces have not experienced any terrorism, including Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Saskatchewan, and the Yukon and the North West Territories.

Linkage to Other Campaigns

Virtually all acts of domestic terrorism flowed out of larger conflicts or disputes. See Table 6. For example, 311 terrorist events were carried out by groups which were linked

Table 3
Day Event Started

Day of Month	Frequency	Percent
1	19	4.6
2	19	4.6
3	13	3.1
4	10	2.4
5	14	3.4
6	15	3.6
7	14	3.4
8	11	2.7
9	4	1.0
10	14	3.4
11	9	2.2
12	10	2.4
13	11	2.7
14	14	3.4
15	9	2.2
16	17	4.1
17	15	3.6
18	5	1.2
19	12	2.9
20	17	4.1
21	6	1.5
22	18	4.4
23	6	1.5
24	11	2.7
25	12	2.9
26	9	2.2
27	11	2.7
28	13	3.1
29	12	2.9
30	22	5.3
31	16	3.9
Missing data	25	6.1
Total	415	100.0

to larger political campaigns. And in virtually all of these instances the larger campaigns, like those of the Quebec separatists and the Sons of Freedom Doukhobors, involved the use of violent tactics other than terrorism. Another forty-two events occurred during the course of labor disputes, twelve were manifestation of racial or hate campaigns. Only six events had no discernible links to groups other than the users of terror tactics themselves.

Group Responsibility for Action

Responsibility for terrorist actions can be anlayzed by distinguishing among events for which an organization claimed responsibility, events for which an organization did not

Table 4
Type of Event

Type of Event	Frequency	Percent
Bombings[a]		
Unknown type	221	53.3
Molotov	51	12.3
Dynamite	28	6.7
Time-delayed	15	3.6
Pipe	3	.7
Letter/parcel	1	.2
Other attacks		
Arson	54	13.0
Destruction-misc.	18	4.3
Seizure/occupation	7	1.7
Theft of animals	4	1.0
Sabotage	2	.5
Attacks on human targets		
Assassination/murder	3	.7
Assault/slashing	2	.5
Assassination attempt	1	.2
Kidnapping	1	.2
Conspiracy to commit	1	.2
Missing data	3	.7
Total	415	100.0

[a] Does not include direct attacks on human targets.

claim responsibility, and events for which attribution was inferred by the nature of the action (target, type of event, location, etc.).

For the majority of events, either no one claimed responsibility, or the information was missing.[46] Only 21 percent of the events definitely had groups claim responsibility. Separatist groups most often claimed responsibility, followed by the Animal Liberation Front. There are several problems with this variable, most importantly the fact that al-

Table 5
Province Where Terrorist Action Took Place

Province	Frequency	Percent
Quebec	231	55.7
British Columbia	151	36.4
Ontario	26	6.3
New Brunswick	3	.7
Alberta	2	.5
Manitoba	1	.2
Newfoundland	1	.2
Total	415	100.0

Table 6
Linkage to Other Campaigns

Linkages	Frequency	Percent
Part of a larger political campaign using violent means	303	73.0
Strike or labor dispute[a]	42	10.1
Racially related attack	12	2.9
Part of a larger political campaign using nonviolent means	6	1.4
Part of a larger political campaign using violent means but acting autonomously	5	1.2
Isolated incident	5	1.2
Bill 101 dispute	3	.5
Protesting treatment of Jews	1	.2
Missing data	39	9.4
Total	415	100.0

[a] Including government liquor store, postal and miscellaneous strikes.

most anyone can make a phone call to claim responsiblity for actions that he or she never committed.

Not all acts of terrorism in Canada have been committed by the groups that have claimed responsibility for them, or by those populary believed to be responsible for them. Actual responsibility was determined from the most reliable sources, for example, if someone belonging to a particular group was convicted for the event. If no reliable source could be found the information was coded as missing. See Table 7. In descending order of importance, Quebec separatist groups committed about 40 percent (166) of the attributed events and the Sons of Freedom Doukhobors committed 31 percent (128). The Animal Liberation Front, first active in 1981, is a distant third with 4.4 percent (eighteen) through 1985.

The activities of the Quebec separatists were mentioned earlier. It is noteworthy to realize that together with the Sons of Freedom Doukhobors, they committed 76.8 percent of all domestic terrorist actions in Canada. Several other groups were ephemeral, their existence demonstrated by only one or two acts of violence. And some groups that engaged in other forms of violence in Canadian society (e.g., the Edmund Burke Society) stopped short of engaging in political terrorism.

Primary and Secondary Targets

The majority of primary targets are private property (229 events, public buildings (93 events), and other public facilities (83 events). See Table 8. This variable reflects more so the target that was first hit than the actual intentions of the terrorists. Specific targets which were hit, in descending order of frequency, were commerical areas, followed by homes and apartments, means of transportation, government buildings, military buildings and installations, power stations/lines, and government liquor stores.

For the majority of events, the information about secondary or incidental targets was missing, or there were no secondary targets. These are generally unintended targets. For the events for which information was valid, private property, such as commercial and residences, followed by people, were generally the principal secondary targets.

Table 7
Group Responsibility for Action

Group	Claimed by group (freq.)	Not Claimed but Reliably Attributed to group (freq.)	Group Inferred to be Resp. (freq.)	Totals Freq.	Totals Percent
Quebec Separatists (RR/FLQ/QLF/ALQ)	44	122	23	189	45.5
Sons of Freedom Doukhobors	2	128	0	130	31.3
Animal Liberation Front	14	4	0	18	4.3
Indian groups:					
American Indian Movement	3	0	0	3	.7
Ojibway Warriors Society	1	0	0	1	.2
Canadian Indians -various	3	0	0	3	.7
Direct Action/ Wimmins Fire Brigade	5	0	0	5	1.2
Friction Directe/ Action Directe	4	0	0	4	1.0
Le Front des Patriotes	1	0	0	1	1.0
Acadian Nationalists	1	0	0	1	1.0
GP	2	0	0	2	.5
Ku Klux Klan	3	0	4	7	1.7
Nazi Party	1	0	0	1	.2
Jewish Defense League factions	0	1	1	2	.4
Missing data				48	11.6
Total	84	255	76	415	100.0

Casualties from Canadian Domestic Political Terrorism

In twenty-five years, only ten people were killed as a result of terrorism. See Table 9. In roughly only 2 percent of the cases of terrorism were there deaths. The people killed were of five types. Only one government official was killed—Pierre Laporte, murdered by the FLQ. Two Canadian civilians killed were workers or employees (a secretary and a receptionist). The security personnel killed were a night watchman making rounds and policeman disabling a bomb. In only two cases were terrorists killed. The first was Harry Kootnikoff, a Sons of Freedom Doukhobor, on February 16, 1962, and the second was Jean Corbo, a member of the FLQ, on July 14, 1966. Both were killed as a result of bombs they were carrying that prematurely exploded. Foreign nationals killed included an Indian, a Fijian, and a Pakistani. These murders were generally the result of racially motivated attacks by right-wing groups. As compared to data sets listing deaths related to international terrorism, no corporation officials or prominent opinion leaders were killed.

More dramatic were the injuries to eighty-three people as a result of terrorism in Canada. In roughly 20 percent of the events, there were injuries from terrorism. In in-

Table 8
Primary and Secondary Targets

Target	Primary Target		Secondary Target	
	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent
Public Buildings				
Government buildings	26	6.3	1	.2
Military buildings[a]	23	5.5		
Community buildings[b]	18	4.3	1	.2
Schools	11	2.7		
Police stations/buildings	6	1.4		
Government liquor stores	5	1.2		
Religious buildings	4	1.0	1	.2
Other Public Facilities				
Postal facilities[c]	27	6.6	1	.2
Public Utilities[d]	21	5.0		
Memorials[e]	16	3.8		
Communication facilities[f]	7	1.7		
Medical facilities[g]	7	1.7	1	.2
Transportation facilities[h]	5	1.2		
Private Property				
Commercial[i]	103	24.8	22	5.3
Residences[j]	65	15.7	22	5.3
Means of transportation	44	10.6	13	3.1
Political organizations	9	2.2	1	.2
Union offices	3	.7		
Others[k]	3	.7	13	3.1
Royal Canadian Legions	2	.5		
People[l]	9	2.2	17	30.6
None	0	0	127	30.6
Missing data	1	.2	195	47.0
Total	415	100.0	415	100.0

[a] Including installations.
[b] Including arenas.
[c] Including stations, trucks and mail boxes
[d] Including power stations and gas lines.
[e] Including tombs, graves, museums, statues, flagpoles, and national parks.
[f] Including radio and tv stations.
[g] Including animal care, facilities, and hospitals.
[h] Including terminals and buses.
[i] Including hotels, restaurants, construction sites, and miscellaneous offices.
[j] Including yards.
[k] Including billboards, equipment, and cans.
[l] This represents people who were directly targeted.

creasing order of frequency, the type of people injured included government officials, foreign nationals, terrorists, security personnel, and Canadian civilians. Once again, the most likely secondary victim was an employee or worker. In most cases, the people injured were not directly targeted but were hit by falling debris or shattered glass. They just happened to be at the wrong place at the wrong time, or they were responding to a bomb call. Also, in most cases in which there were injuries, only one person was injured. Moreover, in most deaths and injuries, the cause was a bomb. This correlates with the general type of event.

A caveat is in order: there are a considerable number of events for which no information on the fate of people was included in the reports. It was assumed that deaths and injuries were considered salient and almost always reported by newspapers.

Finally, to place this information in a larger context, the ninety-three vicitims of domestic terrorism pales in comparison with the number of Canadians who die each year as a result of diseases and accidents.[47]

Conclusion

While the current effort is the most detailed data set on terrorism in Canada, like most data sets, it is not without missing information. The categories of variables can be ranked in descending order of comprehensiveness of information. Incident characteristics variables were the most complete, followed by terrorist characteristics, then target and victim characteristics and losses.

The problem of missing data could be compensated for by examining more sources of information. With greater time, money, and cooperation, this data could be improved by reviewing more Canadian newspapers and the vertical files of Criminology Institutes for newspaper articles that may have been missed in the original search, examining of transcripts from trials of terrorists, records of agencies responsible for Canada's national security, parliamentary debates, French-language news accounts, and English and French government reports, tracking down members of bomb squads who might have their own personal chronologies, reviewing transcripts of radio and television news accounts, and interviewing former terrorists.

Missing information aside, what have we learned or substantiated from this current analysis? First, this study has minimized the perception that terrorists are unpredictable, act randomly, and are indiscriminate in their choices of actions. As demonstrated, terrorists choose among a certain range of limited options. Second, the study has also determined the physical, temporal, and terrorist-imposed boundaries within which Canadian terrorists act. Finally, the analysis has attached a statistical probability to these choices.

The most important policy implications from the statistical analysis of domestic terrorism in Canada may lie in the area of preventing panic and overreaction to terrorist events. This would help policymakers, national security agencies, and others in charge of threat analysis in judging the severity of new campaigns and in the development and implementation of appropriate countermeasures to be taken. This specific research pro-

Table 9
Casualties from Canadian Domestic Terrorism

	Killed		Injured[a]	
	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent
Terrorists	2	20.0	13	15.7
Security personnel[b]	2	20.0	14	16.9
Government officials	1	10.0	2	2.4
Canadian civilians	2	20.0	47	56.6
Foreign nationals	3	30.0	7	8.4
Total	10	100.0	83	100.0

[a] An injury which led to a death was counted as a killing and not an injury to avoid double counting.

[b] Including military, police, security guards, and prison guards.

cess could be further refined by comparing the terrorists' stated rationales for their actions with their target selection, testing theories of causation against the empirical evidence, comparison with rates and trends in other countries, comparison between terrorist campaigns, undertaking comprehensive modeling efforts that include multivariate, time series, and process analyses, and conducting simulation studies.

Concomitantly, the more significant finding of this analysis was the decline of domestic terrorism. Contrary to some academic research[48] and government pronouncements,[49] the largest amount of terrorism in Canada has been domestic, and, contrary to common expectations, it has decreased since the early 1970s. This phenomenon has led to some theoretical speculation on the causes of decline.[50]

Other avenues for research include the exploration of other questions such as: the effects of terrorism on society as a whole, the context of the event (e.g., the party that was in power), and policy responses.

This data set should also be compared with others currently available or being constructed. This leads to three meaningful comparisons/tests: with terrorism in other countries (both similar and dissimilar),[51] with groups using terrorism in other countries, and between different types of terrorism in Canada. While not as frequent or as threatening, international and state terrorism in Canada have been the subject of much popular and governmental speculation.[52] Finally, all three types of terrorism should eventually be compared and interactions among them explored.

Another question to be explored may be the extent of transnational diffusion effects in domestic terrorism, a question raised by Midlarsky, Crenshaw, and Yoshida. That is, to what extent have political movements and phenomena in other countries stimulated extremist activities in Canada?

In conclusion, a cursory analysis of the data suggests that the typical domestic political terrorist event occurring in Canada was a bombing of an unknown type, which took place May 30, 1968, in Quebec. It was also part of a larger political campaign using violent means, committed by a separatist group, which claimed responsibility, and aimed at a commercial building but did not injure anyone. This may mean that Canadians have experienced a passing wave of domestic terrorism and that future prospects will pale in comparison to the 1968 period.

Acknowledgment

The author is grateful to Ted Robert Gurr for his helpful comments and criticisms, both methodological and editorial.

Notes

1. This perception is expressed in a number of critiques of the subject including Edward Francis Mickolus, *Combatting International Terrorism: A Quantitative Analysis*, Ph.D. Dissertation (Yale University, 1981).

2. Exceptions include, for example, selections in Yonah Alexander and John M. Gleason (eds.), *Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism* (Toronto: Pergamon Press, 1981) and Manus I. Midlarsky, Martha Crenshaw, and Fumihiko Yoshida, "Why Violence Spreads: The Contagion of International Terrorism," *International Studies Quarterly* 24 (1980):262–298.

3. This is reflected in the fact that most of the bibliographies on terrorism focus on international terrorism. See any one of a number of bibliographies such as Edward Francis Mickolus, *The Literature of Terrorism: A Selectively Annotated Bibliography* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1980); Amos Lakos, *International Terrorism: A Bibliography* (Boulder: Westview Press,

1986); and University Microfilm International's recent project, *Terrorism: An International Resource File*.

4. Some country-specific data sets on terrorist incidents are reviewed in Alex Schmid, *Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, and Data Bases and Literature* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1983), 100. For a recent example of the application of events data to domestic terrorism, see Leonard Wienberg and William Lee Eubank, *The Rise and Fall of Italian Terrorism* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987). More common is the use of events data for the study of particular groups that operate in advanced industrialized countries, such as Robert P. Clark. *The Basque Insurgents* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984).

5. In fact, Canada has a limited experience with terrorism relative to other, more common forms of political violence, such as riots, clashes, and attacks. And actions like coups, guerrilla conflicts, civil wars, and revolutions have been nonexistent. See Judy Torrance, *Public Violence in Canada, 1867–1982* (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1986), 45.

6. These events are used in "International Terrorism in Canada: Testing the Diffusion and Contagion Effects," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Windsor, Canada June 11, 1988b.

7. ATIC III has not yet been fully coded.

8. *The Report of the Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and the Public Safety* (Kelly Committee) (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1987).

9. See, for example, J.M.S. Careless, *Canada: A Story of Challenge,* Revised Edition (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1970), 37–58, for a brief history of this type of political violence.

10. The Doukhobors are a sect of Russian Christians that came to Canada from Russia at the turn of the century. Approximately 2,500 Doukhobors form the radical sect the Sons of Freedom Doukhobors. They are religiously conservative, highly zealous, reject materialism, and oppose government-sponsored education and more government regulation. They have been responsible for a considerable amount of violence, directed at other Doukhobors, non-Doukhobor business interests, and government related targets.

11. The most widely known wave of domestic terrorism in Canada was carried out in the name of the FLQ. The FLQ advocated the separation of Quebec from Canada and the creation of a leftist state.

12. See Jeffrey Ian Ross, "An Events Data Base on Political Terrorism in Canada: Some Conceptual and Methodological Problems," *Conflict Quarterly* 3, no. 2 (Spring 1988): 47–65.

13. See, for example, Walter Laqueur, *The Age of Terrorism* (Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1987), Chapter 3.

14. Schmid, 1985, 110.

15. *Ibid,* 111.

16. See, for example, Paul Wilkinson, *Political Terrorism* (Toronto: John Wiley and Sons, 1974); Frederick J. Hacker, *Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies: Terror and Terrorism in our Time* (New York: Bantam, 1976); and Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change,* Second Edition (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1982).

17. The definitions of the different types of terrorism are based on Mickolus, 1981, 2–8, 2–9.

18. For purposes of clarification, the CIA distinguishes between international and transnational terrorism. The CIA's definitions of international and transnational terrorism are equivalent to Mickolus' respective definitions of interstate and international terrorism. For purposes of this study, international and transnational terrorism are combined under the category of international terrorism.

19. See Lorne Brown and Caroline Brown, *An Unauthorized History of the RCMP* (Toronto: James Lewis and Samuel, 1973); Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, *Second Report-Freedom and Security under the Law* (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services Canada, 1981); and Robert Dion, *Crimes of the Secret Police* (Montreal: Black Rose Books, Ltd., 1982).

20. See Anthony Kellett, *International Terrorism: A Retrospective and Prospective Examina-*

tion (Ottawa: Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, Canadian Department of National Defence, May 1981).

21. James Littleton, *Target Nation: Canada and the Western Intelligence Network* (Toronto: Lester & Orphen Dennys and CBC Enterprises, 1986).

22. See Jeffrey Ian Ross, "Domestic Political Terrorism in Canada 1960–1985: A Statistical and Critical Analysis," paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Hamilton, Canada, 6 June 1987; and Jeffrey Ian Ross and Ted Robert Gurr, "Why Terrorism Subsides: A Comparative Study of Canada and the United States," *Comparative Politics* (1988, forthcoming).

23. See Ted Robert Gurr, "Empirical Research on Political Terrorism: The State of the Art and How it might be Improved," in *Current Perspectives on International Terrorism,* eds. Robert O. Slater and Michael Stohl (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988). The author also recognizes that a complete understanding of any field requires a multidisciplinary approach.

24. Researchers, however, must be cautious of the discrete versus aggregate data problem. "The difficulty arises out of the fact that what may be true of aggregates need not be true of the individual who composes them," from Heinz Eulau, "Segments of Political Science Most Susceptible to Behavioristic treatment" in *Contemporary Political Analysis,* ed. James C. Charlesworth (New York: The Free Press, 1967), 47.

25. See Charles F. Doran, Robert E. Donley, and George E. Antones, "A Test of Cross-National Event Reliability: Global versus Regional Data Sources," *International Studies Quarterly* 17(June 1973):175–203; David C. Snyder, "Collective Violence: A Research Agenda and Some Strategic Considerations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 22(No. 3, September 1978):499–534; and Robert W. Jackman and William Boyd, "Multiple Sources in the Collection of Data on Political Confict," *American Journal of Political Science* 23(May 1979):434–458.

26. Philip M. Burgess, "Introduction: 'Watch the Canary!' and Other Admonitions," in *Theory and Practice of Events Research,* eds. Edward E. Azar and Joseph D. Ben-Dak (New York: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1975), xiii.

27. Ross and Gurr, 1988.

28. Thomas H. Mitchell, *Politically-Motivated Terrorism in North America: The Threat and the Response* Ph.D. Dissertation (Carleton University, 1985).

29. See Kellett, *op. cit.*

30. David Charters, "Canadian Security Intelligence Problems in Historical Perspective," paper presented at the Conference on Intelligence and Policy, jointly sponsored by the Defense Intelligence College and the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., Aug. 27–28, 1986.

31. Charters, 1986, p. 3.

32. See Ross, 1987; Ross and Gurr, 1988; and Jeffrey Ian Ross, *Domestic Political Terrorism in Canada: An Empirical Analysis,* M.A. Thesis (University of Colorado, 1988a).

33. In general collection, classification, and coding procedures follow conventions developed in Richard L. Merrit and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross National Research* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966) and Ted Robert Gurr, *Polimetrics: An Introduction to Quantitative Macropolitics* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1972).

34. The author sent requests to major metropolitan Canadian Police departments, Provincial Police departments, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), and the Department of National Defense (DND), all of whom were asked for available chronologies and data bases on terrorism. The majority of organizations could not provide any information. The author is indebted, however, to Gregory Cran of Department of the Attorney General of British Columbia, who supplied a chronology of Sons of Freedom Doukhobor incidents.

35. For a more in-depth, but slightly out-of-date, review of terrorism data bases, see William W. Fowler, *Terrorism Data Bases: A Comparison of Missions, Methods, and Systems* (Santa Monica, California: Rand Publications N-15103-RC, 1981). For an alternative review of data bases, see Schmid 1983, Chapter III.

36. This survey, which was initiated by the CIA in 1968, was turned over to the State Department in the early days of the Reagan Administration. Since its inception, the CIA/State Department data set has been a highly regarded and widely quoted source of descriptive statistics. Allegations, however, have been made that its coding scheme was redesigned to suit the foreign policy objectives of the Reagan Administration. The entire data set was then backdated to include threats and hoaxes, which resulted in a doubling of the number of incidents since 1968. See Michael Stohl, "CIA rapport valt beleid-Haig af," *Volksrant* (March 30, 1981), 1, as quoted in Schmid 1983:213.

37. Problems with these data sets are assessed in more detail in Ross, 1988a.

38. For a more detailed discussion of the source coverage issues see Mickolus, 1980; Edward E. Azar, "The Problem of Source Coverage in the Use of Events Data," *International Studies Quarterly* 16(No. 3, 1969):373–388; Edward E. Azar, "Analysis of International Events," *Peace Research Review* 4(No. 1, 1970); Edward E. Azar, Stanley H. Cohen, Thomas O. Jukam, and James M. McCormick, "The Problem of Source Coverage in the Use of International Events Data," *International Studies Quarterly* (September 1972):373–378; Philip M. Burgess and Raymond W. Lawton, "Evaluating Events Data: Problems of Conception, Reliability, and Validity," in *International Events and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy*, eds. Charles W. Kegley Jr., Gregory A. Raymond, Robert M. Rood, and Richard A. Skinner (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1975), 106–119; and Charles F. Doran, Robert E. Denley, and George E. Antunes, "A Test of Cross-National Event Reliability: Global versus Regional Data Sources," *International Studies Quarterly* 17(No. 2, June 1973):175–203.

39. It was also hypothesized that the accuracy of chronology construction might be improved if the author could obtain inhouse news indexes or listings of articles that would fall under the category of political terrorism in Canada from the "morgues" of major Canadian newspapers. Consequently, a request was sent out by the author to major Canadian newspapers for these types of research aids. This procedure, like the requests to the police and national security agencies, yielded very little information. Most news organizations could not help in this respect. The author is grateful, however, for a listing from Sheila Mooney of articles on terrorism and the Sons of Freedom Doukhobors that appeared in the "morgues" of the *Vancouver Sun*.

40. See Micheal J. Kelly and Thomas H. Mitchell, "The Study of Internal Conflict in Canada: Problems and Prospects," *Conflict Quarterly* II(No. 1, Summer 1981):10–17, suggesting this time frame.

41. See Connor Cruise O'Brien, "The Roots of Terrorism," *The New Republic* (July 25, 1981): 29–32, for an examination of this problem in relationship to Claire Sterling's book *The Terror Network* (New York: Holt, Rinehard and Winston, 1981).

42. For a complete listing of all the variables, see Ross 1988a.

43. See Ted Robert Gurr and Associates, *Comparative Studies of Political Conflict and Change: Cross National Datasets* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1978) and Edward F. Mickolus, *ITERATE: International Terrorist Events-Data Codebook* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1976).

44. Compare Brian Jenkins and Janera Johnson, *International Terrorism: A Chronology, 1968–1974* (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 1975) with Edward F. Mickolus, *Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events, 1968–1979* (Westport: Greenwood, 1980).

45. The following information consists of a consolidation of the more significant variables that were investigated. For a more complete listing of the results from the variables, see Ross 1988a.

46. One might be tempted not to include those events for which no organizations claimed responsibility, but due to the nature of the target or background details surrounding the action, they were definitely domestic political terrorism in nature.

47. In 1982 the five leading causes of death for both sexes in Canada were cardiovascular disease, cancer, accidents, pneumonia, and diabetes mellitus. Cardiovascular disease alone accounted for 80,321 deaths, as cited in Statistics Canada *Canadian Year Book* (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1985).

48. See, for example, Charters, 1986.

49. See, for example, Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, *Second Report—Freedom and Security under the Law* (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services Canada, 1981); and *The Report of the Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and Public Safety* (1987).

50. See Ross, 1988a, and Ross and Gurr, 1988.

51. The results of a comparative analysis achieved through cross-national studies would permit us to test for the effects of system-wide characteristics.

52. See Mark Irving Lichbach, "Deterrence or Escalation? the Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31(No. 2, June 1987):266–297, for an example of this type of research.