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Jeffrey Ian Ross; Ted Robert Gurr

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Why Terrorism Subsides

A Comparative Study of Canada and the United States

Jeffrey Ian Ross and Ted Robert Gurr

The prevailing impression given by the mass media, public officials, and experts concerned with oppositional terrorism is that it is a clear and present danger, inexorably on the increase around the world. The statistical evidence on this point is less than persuasive. Unquestionably there was a sustained increase during the 1970s in the global aggregate of international terrorism, defined as terrorism carried out by autonomous nonstate actors and affecting nationals of at least two states.[1] In the 1980s, however, international terrorism has fluctuated markedly from year to year, and it is difficult to reach any conclusions about long-term trends. And unless one subscribes to global conspiracy theories of terrorism,[2] there is no reason to assume that trends or fluctuations in international terrorism have parallels in the incidence of domestic terrorism. Most important, the reliance on global or regional aggregates to analyze trends in either international or domestic terrorism obscures more than it reveals because it conveys the misleading impression that the trends are common to all countries and extremist movements.

Specifically, there is ample evidence that oppositional terrorism in a number of western democracies has declined very substantially in recent years. Terrorist events in Italy, which increased from less than 400 per year in 1969–70 to over 2000 annually in 1978–79, fell to less than one hundred per year in the mid 1980s.[3] In Canada terrorist events averaged more than forty per year from 1968 to 1971 before declining to a very low level through the late 1970s.[4] In the United States there was a similar peak in political terrorism the late 1960s and early 1970s, followed by a precipitous decline, from an average of 120 events annually in the mid 1970s to twelve events annually in 1984–86 (based on FBI reports, discussed further below). Northern Ireland is cursed by a terrorist campaign of the most persistent kind, one based on the separatist demands of a distinct communal minority. Nonetheless, Irish terrorism has declined irregularly from a 1971–74 average of about 7000 incidents to 1500 in the early 1980s.[5] But the phenomenon of decline in terrorism is not uniform across all western countries: there have been significant short-term deviations from the declining secular trend in these four countries, while West Germany experienced a sharp increase in violence by the Red Army Faction and allied groups in the mid 1980s and France was hit by a similar surge in 1986–87.

The Comparative Study of Political Terrorism

This article is concerned principally with documenting and examining in more detail the declining incidence of terrorism by domestic opposition groups in Canada and the United

States. The two countries are chosen for comparative analysis because in two separate studies we observed superficially similar patterns of increase and decline in the phenomena, documented in more detail below.[6] The two countries are in many respects suitable for a "most similar cases" comparative analysis since they are both European immigrant societies and have evolved generally similar democratic political cultures and federal political systems.[7] Moreover, because of their proximity, high levels of social and cultural interaction, and economic interdependence, political issues in each country have spillover effects in the other. The nature and circumstances of political conflict in the two countries have been very different, however. The United States has had disproportionately more violent conflict throughout its history than Canada.[8] As Lipset has argued, the United States was born in the spirit of a revolution and Canada in a counterrevolution. The phrase both summarizes and helps account for some distinctive features of Canadian political culture. Canadians are, among other things, more collectively oriented, more accepting of authority, and less homicidal, and they engage in proportionately far fewer acts of political protest and violence than Americans south of the border.[9] Moreover, the major issues of conflict in the contemporary period are sharply different: sectarian antigovernment protest by Doukhobors and separatism by Québecois in Canada, racial conflict and opposition to war in the United States. So there is no warrant for assuming that the rise and decline of terrorism in one country is a mirror-image reflection of events in the other.

Some conceptual questions about the nature of terrorism must be resolved before proceeding to comparisons. There is a considerable debate about the most useful definition of terrorism. After an exhaustive analysis of over one hundred expert definitions, Schmid concludes that there is no "true or correct definition. . . ." Nevertheless, he outlines twenty-two elements of definitions and ostensibly develops a consensus definition consisting of five parts. First, terrorism is a method of combat in which random or symbolic victims are targets of violence. Second, through previous use of violence or the credible threat of violence, other members of that group or class are put in a state of chronic fear. Third, the victimization of the target is considered extranormal by most observers, which, fourth, creates an audience beyond the target of terror. Fifth, the purpose of terrorism is either to immobilize the target of terror in order to produce disorientation and/or compliance or to mobilize secondary targets of demands (for example, government) or targets of attention (for example, public opinion).[10] This definition encompasses terrorism by governments, by oppositions, and by international movements.

With two qualifications, this conceptualization of terrorism suits our purposes. First, not all five elements must demonstrably be present for an event or campaign to be labeled terrorist. In particular, the observer seldom knows for certain whether a larger audience is in fact put in fear by random or symbolic violence. It also is sometimes a matter of supposition that the perpetrators seek "to produce disorientation and/or compliance." As a practical matter, the analyst usually must infer intent and psychological effects from the nature of actions, targets, and what is known about or claimed by the perpetrator. Second, Schmid's definition neglects acts of symbolic violence against property. While he "concedes that some violence against symbolic things can be considered terroristic," he sees this as exceptional; "therefore it needs not to be included."[11] In fact, such attacks are not exceptional. In the U.S., all of the nineteen bombings claimed by the Weather Underground were targeted against property. In Canada, less than a tenth of the 166 violent attacks known

to have been carried out by Quebec separatists had human targets or victims. Thus we regard as terroristic those violent attacks on symbolic material targets which have the other essential traits and objectives identified by Schmid.

We are specifically concerned in this comparison with oppositional terrorism by domestic groups. Domestic terrorism is carried on by autonomous nonstate actors, in their country of origin, against domestic targets. The practitioners obtain their weapons and financing for the most part within their home country and are motivated by indigenous causes. In practice there often are some international elements to terrorism by domestic groups. For example, in 1970 the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) kidnapped James Cross, the British trade commissioner in Montreal. And in 1974 the New World Liberation Front repeatedly bombed West Coast facilities of International Telephone and Telegraph because of the corporation's supposed complicity in the 1973 coup against President Salvador Allende of Chile. For operational purposes we include in our study only campaigns carried out by domestic groups against targets located within Canada and the United States.

We also make the following a priori assumptions about the motivations underlying the resort to terrorism. First, political terrorism is purposive behavior by groups (sometimes very small ones) aimed at influencing their political environment. It may be other things as well: it may be expressive for those who carry it out or used to maintain group solidarity. But it is mainly utilitarian, in the mind-set within which the group acts, and thus is subject to tactical and strategic reassessment in response to changes within the group and in its larger political environment.[12] Second, groups using the tactics of terrorism choose it as one among a number of alternative means of pursuing political ends. It is part of a repertoire of actions, a tool that can be picked up and later set down or used in conjunction with others. Third, terrorist campaigns usually arise out of larger political movements or tendencies. Its practitioners rarely are autistic, in the sense of being wholly disconnected from the rest of society. Rather, they virtually always believe they are acting in the interests of some larger group —workers, women, persecuted minorities, the Aryan race, their own kin and communities.[13]

Some specific arguments about the decline of terrorism in North America follow from these general assumptions. First, the declines observed in both countries are the aggregate of decisions made by members of a number of specific political organizations or movements. Second, these decisions are made at least partly in response to changes in the larger social and political environment in which they act. Third, we assume that some common dynamics underlie the movement toward and away from terrorism which affect all present and potential users of terrorist tactics in advanced industrial democracies, but we all expect that the timing and details of the process vary with the immediate political circumstances of each radical group. Thus a full explanation of the onset and decline of terrorism should include an analysis both of the development of larger political conflicts, including the actions and reactions of authorities and the larger public, and of the specific objectives and acts of radical groups and their consequences for the group. This article contributes to this kind of contextual political analysis by specifying some general factors in the decline of terrorism, then uses them to interpret the detailed Canadian and U.S. evidence.

Explanations of the Decline of Oppositional Terrorism

The literature on oppositional terrorism is preoccupied with the question of causation but has

little to say about the general circumstances under which it declines.[14] Insofar as the question is addressed at all, it is generally assumed to follow from the success (rare) or failure (much more common) of the terrorists in achieving their goals, whatever they may be. The success of anticolonial terrorists in winning independence for Cyprus (1955–58) and Algeria (1954–62) made further terrorism there unnecessary. The unrelieved failure of revolutionaries in advanced industrial democracies to achieve their political objectives by terrorism is assumed to explain their decline, though chronic failure does not explain either the sporadic recurrence of revolutionary terrorism in some democracies or the fact that some such movements have been much more resilient and persistent than others.[15]

Not all terrorists in western societies seek revolution. Some want greater autonomy or benefits for a communal minority; others seek attention to particular social or political causes at home or abroad. Since the goals of such groups are often diverse or ambiguous, it is very difficult to judge their degrees of "success" either on their own terms or by external criteria. Moreover, it is not plausible to expect that success, even if we know how terrorists judge it, will lead them to forego violence. Limited or tactical successes seem more likely to increase the utilities attributed to terrorism (in rational-choice terminology) and to reinforce the disposition to future violent behavior (in terms of learning theory), rather than inhibiting terrorism.[16]

An alternative approach to accounting for the decline of terrorism in specific western democracies can be derived from Mack's general analysis of the strategy of conflict as applied to terrorism.[17] He observes that the relative strength of the contending parties determines the outcome of conflict and that in violent confrontations—which terrorist and counterterrorist campaigns certainly are—"strength" depends on the parties' military and political capabilities. The "military" capabilities of terrorists (called coercion below) are their ability to use force—bombings, hostage-takings—and credible threats of force. In modern states, both democratic and autocratic ones, these capabilities are usually miniscule by comparison with the capabilities of the state's internal security agency. Terrorists' political capabilities include such factors as members' commitment to their cause, degree of organization, and the extent of their political support. For terrorists, as for small and besieged countries like Israel and Vietnam, high political capabilities give them a fighting capacity far beyond what might be expected on the basis of their technical military capabilities.[18]

It follows from this distinction that the loss of either coercive or political capabilities will lead to the decline of terrorist campaigns, though not necessarily to the decline of the larger political movements which spawn (some) such campaigns. The loss of capabilities can occur either internal to the group using terrorism or in the larger environment in which it operates or both. Thus, there are four general kinds of conditions which can contribute to the decline of political terrorism. *Preemption* and *deterrence* are counterterrorist policies and actions of the authorities which reduce or eliminate the terrorists' coercive capabilities. *Burnout* and *backlash* are general conditions which reduce the political capabilities of groups using terrorism.

Preemption directly affects active terrorists by making it impossible for them to act. Their targets are hardened; they are imprisoned or killed. Deterrence is achieved by increasing the risks for terrorists and people who might join or support them. Policies that are intended to have a deterrent effect include new antiterrorist laws (national and international), more

stringent penalties, extradition treaties, increased surveillance, and the (publicized) development of antiterrorist squads, tactics, and technology. The tactics of preemption are also likely to have a secondary deterrent effect.

The loss of political capabilities probably contributes more to the decline of terrorist campaigns in democratic societies than any actions taken by authorities. Burnout refers to members' declining commitment to the group and its purposes. It is reflected in such phenomena as doctrinal debates and factionalization, defections, disinclination of members to take risks, growing resistance to leaders' demands and strictures, and a shift in tactics from an emphasis on political action to predation (bank robberies, extortion) for its own sake. Backlash is our term for declining political support for the terrorists' acts and objectives. It is a widely observed consequence of terrorist campaigns, especially but not only in democratic societies, that their acts antagonize previously neutral and disinterested groups and alienate many of the people on behalf of whom they claim to act. Other sources of backlash include propaganda campaigns by public officials and the media aimed at discrediting terrorists' causes and supposed allies and counterterror strategies that raise the costs for ordinary citizens of tolerating the terrorists' presence. Whatever its causes, backlash makes it more difficult for terrorist groups to acquire resources and recruits, carry out attacks, find refuge, and avoid informants.

The analytic distinctions among preemption, deterrence, burnout, and backlash provide a framework for studying the sources of decline in North American terrorism. As we shall see, events which contributed to the decline of specific groups do not necessarily fall neatly in one category. Police shoot-outs with Black Panthers in the United States were the occasion of killings and arrests (preemption) which presumably had a deterrent effect on survivors and potential recruits. Public backlash against bombings by the Weather Underground evidently contributed to subsequent factional disputes, defections, and shifts in tactics within the group(s). Nonetheless, we can use the analytic distinctions to gauge the impact of events on terrorist groups and to make some initial assessments of the causes of their decline.

The "success" of terrorists in achieving political objectives can also be evaluated in this analytic framework. With a handful of revolutionary exceptions, political terrorists rarely achieve their announced objectives. It is often the case, though, that some progress toward some of their objectives is realized. This is especially likely in democratic systems, for a variety of reasons: the presence of a free press through which demands for change can be made, the interest of some politicians in getting the electoral support of disaffected groups, and efforts of national leaders to preempt more serious challenges by offering reforms. Of course such efforts at accommodation virtually never acknowledge the demands of groups using terrorism, but rather are addressed to grievances that are expressed by more moderate spokesmen using less extreme methods. The province of Quebec gained a considerable increase in autonomy during the 1960s and 1970s,[19] and the political and economic status of black Americans improved considerably as a result of new federal policies introduced during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.[20]

The question here is what impact such accommodations and reforms might be expected to have on terrorism. Their principal effect, we suggest, is to undermine the political capabilities of terrorist groups. Once it becomes evident that dominant groups are prepared to accommodate some demands of an aggrieved minority, terrorism becomes a less attractive strategy. For potential terrorists its relative utilities no longer compensate for its risks. It

becomes apparent to most that there are less costly ways of achieving moderate but more certain gains. For those who sympathize with the cause advocated by terrorists but not their tactics, the latter now become an active threat to the process of accommodation. Thus by both processes, accommodation and reform tend to reduce the political capabilities of terrorist groups. And, at second hand, declining political support increases the ease with which police can preempt and deter terrorist actions. This helps to explain why terrorist groups like the Basque ETA and the Provisional IRA have sometimes reacted to accommodations with intensified violence: their *raison d'être* and collective survival are threatened when conflict becomes less polarized.

The Subsidence of Canadian Terrorism

Almost 500 political terrorist events occurred in Canada between 1960 and 1985. Roughly 85 percent (415) of the events were domestic, and 15 percent (71) were transnational.[21] The domestic events, which are the subject of this analysis, occurred in three waves (see Figure 1). The first wave peaked in 1961 and consisted mainly of acts perpetrated by the Sons of Freedom Doukhobors. The Doukhobors are Russian Christians who emigrated to Canada at the turn of the century. About 2500 of the 20,000 Doukhobors form the radical sect, the Sons of Freedom, whose members live in eastern British Columbia. Periodic episodes of religious zealotry in search of purification and martyrdom have been responsible for waves of demonstrations, burnings, and bombings directed at other Doukhobors, businesses, rail

Figure 1 Domestic Terrorism in Canada, 1960–1985



lines, and government buildings. Almost all Doukhobor terrorism documented in this study occurred during such an episode in 1961–62 and is not further analyzed in this article.[22]

The early 1960s also saw the onset of separatist-related terrorism, which peaked first in 1963–65 and then surged to a much higher level in 1968. By 1973, however, terrorism by the FLQ and other Quebec extremist groups had abated. Periodic but low level activity by right-wing groups took place during the mid 1970s, followed by the third wave, a minor upsurge in anarchist/left-wing terrorism at the end of the 1970s that persisted into the early 1980s.

Not all acts of terrorism in Canada have been committed by the groups which claimed responsibility for them or by those which were popularly believed to be responsible for them. Consequently, the analysis in Table 1 is based on the 339 events which are unequivocally known to have been carried out by the groups listed. In descending order of importance, Quebec separatist groups committed about 50 percent (166) of the attributed events, and the Sons of Freedom Doukhobors committed 37 percent (130). The Animal Liberation Front, first active in 1981, is a distant third with eighteen events through 1985. To analyze what underlies the downward trends it is useful to examine the rise and decline of terrorism by the FLQ, the group responsible for most Canadian domestic terrorism since 1963.

The FLQ, the best-known separatist group practicing terrorism, advocated the separation of Quebec from Canada and creation of a leftist state. Compartmentalized FLQ networks or cells operated between 1962 and 1973 with peaks of activity in 1963, 1965, and 1968 (see Figure 2).The FLQ arose out of the larger separatist movement, widespread among French-speaking Canadians in the early 1960s and based on the belief that Québecois cultural and economic interests were not being adequately served.[23] Two important separatist organizations which gave expression to this sentiment were the Rassemblement pour l'Indépendance Nationale (RIN), founded in September 1960, and to its left the Action

Table 1 Domestic Groups Actually Responsible for Terrorist Actions in Canada, 1960–1985

Group	Number of Actions	Percent	Years of Activity
Quebec separatists (RR, FLQ, QLF, ALQ)	166	50.0	1963-1972
Sons of Freedom Doukhobors	130	38.3	1960-1972
Animal Liberation Front	18	5.3	1981-1985
Indian groups:			
American Indian Movement	3	0.9	1974-1977
Ojibway Warriors Society	1	0.3	1974
Canadian Indians--various	3	0.9	1974-1983
Direct Action/Wimmins Fire Brigade	5	1.5	1982
Friction Directe/Action Directe	4	1.2	1983
Ku Klux Klan	3	0.9	1980-1981
GP	2	0.6	1980
Jewish Defense League factions	2	0.6	1971
Acadian Nationalists	1	0.3	1978
Le Front du Patriotes	1	0.3	1983
Totals	339	100.0	

Figure 2 Terrorist Events Attributable to Quebec Separatists, 1962–1980



Socialiste pour l'Indépendance du Québec (ASIQ). The majority of future FLQ members were dissatisfied activists of the RIN and ASIQ, twenty-four of whom met in November 1962 to develop more radical but nonviolent forms of action for the cause of independence. In February 1963 three members of this group formed the FLQ: George Schoeters, Gabriel Hudon, and Raymond Villeneuve, the last of whom recruited new members from among his friends.[24]

The violent actions of the FLQ began with bombings against military targets and expanded to include government targets, the economic infrastructure, and then targets which symbolized the FLQ's support of striking workers. The high point of FLQ terrorism was the successive kidnappings (by two separate FLQ cells) of James Cross on October 5, 1970, and five days later Pierre Laporte, the Quebec minister of labour and immigration. On October 17, after the federal government proclaimed the War Measures Act (WMA), Laporte was killed and left in the trunk of an abandoned car. On December 4, Cross' abductors traded his life for safe conduct to Cuba. In addition to the murder of Laporte, the FLQ's actions were responsible for the deaths of seven people, countless dollars worth of property damage, and several bank holdups. Stepped-up surveillance by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Security Service (RCMPSS) and the Quebec Provincial Police (QPP), including the use of informants, led to a series of arrests and convictions from late 1970 to 1972. These, along with the incarceration of previous members of the FLQ and the flight of other activists into foreign exile, coincided with the end of violent activism in 1972.

This sketch raises more questions about the causes of the decline than it answers. FLQ cells were effective in recruiting new members and carrying out actions from 1963 through 1971 despite intensive security measures and the arrest and trial, in 1967–68, of Pierre

Vallières and Charles Gagnon, men whose theoretical and tactical writings had provided inspiration and guidance to the FLQ.[25] Their arrest and conviction was followed by a fresh round of FLQ terrorism. The arrests and detentions after the Cross and Laporte kidnappings also led to a short-run spate of new violence. The causes of the final cessation of FLQ terrorism can be interpreted using the four categories proposed above. One of the two most significant factors, in our view, was preemption (through arrests), both directly and through its indirect deterrent effect. More important was the FLQ's loss of political capabilities because of backlash, which in turn contributed to burnout among key activists.

Preemption While the War Measures Act was in effect (October 1970 to January 1971) more than 500 persons were detained without charge and key members of the FLQ were arrested. Among the twenty FLQ members sentenced to prison were three who were responsible for Laporte's kidnapping and murder. Despite these measures some FLQ cells escaped detection and in early 1971 they began to reorganize. A new wave of bombings and holdups began in March 1971 and continued through the fall. By this time, however, the antiterrorist section of the Montreal police had informers and *agent provocateur* Carole de Vault in place.[26] On October 4, and 5, 1971, on the first anniversary of the October crisis, some sixty officers of the combined antiterrorist squad carried out a large-scale roundup in Montreal and arrested four FLQ members. The following May the police arrested members of the FLQ's "Saint-Henri network." In June 1972 there were four more arrests. Finally, in November 1972 a police roundup led to the arrest of nearly a dozen people suspected of being linked to two FLQ cells.

Deterrence The waves of arrests of FLQ members from 1970 to 1972 undoubtedly had a deterrent effect on many would-be supporters. So did the well-publicized presence of the special police units mentioned above. Less direct deterrent effects may have followed from new antiterrorist legislation and security measures. In 1971 hijacking was made a criminal offense and more severe penalties provided. During the early 1970s security was increased at Canadian airports as well as at government buildings, nuclear facilities, and corporations. The Canadian government also strengthened its capacities for dealing with international terrorism, not least because organizing activities of FLQ exiles in Algeria, Cuba, and elsewhere continued through the mid 1970s. The main concern, though, was to lessen the likelihood of terrorist acts at the Olympic Games in Montreal in 1976. From 1973 to 1976, the RCMPSS, the QPP, the Montreal police, and the Canadian armed forces cooperated in "Operation Olympics." The payoff of their intensive intelligence and security activities was an Olympics free of terrorist episodes, whether by Quebec separatists or anyone else.

Backlash The political capabilities of the FLQ changed fundamentally during 1970. The immediate consequence of the October crisis and Laporte's murder was the loss of public support. Major labor unions in Quebec formed a common front to denounce the FLQ, and the general public also seemed overwhelmingly to support the emergency powers and the presence of the army in Quebec.[27] Almost simultaneously, in December 1970 the separatist Parti Québecois (PQ) came in second in the provincial election with seven seats and 23 percent of the vote. The PQ's manifesto, issued a year later, proclaimed the need for a struggle for national independence and "social revolution" but also condemned political violence as "humanly immoral and politically pointless." It pointedly warned impatient young activists against joining "childish cells in a fruitless revolutionary adventurism which might cost them their future and even their lives."[28]

Thus, Laporte's murder marked a watershed in the political history of the FLQ. It helped swing public opinion among Québecois away from the FLQ and toward more conventional forms of political participation. Popular support for the PQ as the legitimate movement for independence increased and contributed to the PQ's victory in the 1976 provincial election. On the deterrent side, the federal government's strong response during the October crisis left many Québecois with the feeling that Ottawa would suspend their civil liberties by reimposing the War Measures Act if events in Quebec again threatened public order. As Mitchell observes, "while the political aspirations of [the FLQ] were shared by many Québecois, the group's use of increasingly violent tactics served to discredit it as a political force in the province." Moreover, the PQ's 1976 victory demonstrated that "the struggle for independence did not necessitate acts of terrorism but could take place within the framework of democracy and the rule of the majority.[29]

Burnout The rise of the PQ attracted both actual and potential participants away from increasingly dangerous and irrelevant FLQ activities. In December 1971, for example, two weeks after publication of the PQ manifesto, Pierre Vallières emerged from three years in hiding to announce that he was leaving the FLQ and joining the PQ. In a book justifying his decision he argued that the FLQ was a "shock group" whose continued activities would only play into the hands of forces of repression for which it was no match. "There has never been," he said, "an FLQ organization as such but rather a collection of groups or cells with little or no contact between them, with no guiding nucleus and no real strategy." All they had in common was their choice of the three letters "FLQ."[30] A number of other members followed Vallières in his break with the FLQ. Similarly, self-exiled members of the FLQ began returning to Canada beginning in late 1971 and continuing through 1982 and were given light sentences for old terrorist offenses. Some denounced "FLQism;" most joined the PQ.

In the final analysis, the nature and structure of the FLQ made it impossible to eliminate the group completely through preemption and deterrence. It was as much a state of mind as an organization. Any group of dissatisfied Québecois can carry out a bombing spree, a kidnapping, or a murder in the name of the FLQ. Many of the guns and dynamite stolen two decades ago have not been recovered, and many activists and sympathizers have avoided detection. Yet only one FLQ terrorist act has been carried out since 1972. The reasons are essentially political ones. Quebec separatism has legitimate outlets and real accomplishments, conditions which have for now eliminated the appeal of violent separatism for would-be terrorists and their larger political audience.

We also can speculate on the consequences of the referendum on sovereignty-association which was held by the PQ on May 20, 1980. The referendum sought public affirmation of a watered-down form of Quebec autonomy but failed to gain majority support within the province. A simple stimulus-response theory of terrorism would predict that a fresh wave of FLQ terrorism should have followed the defeat. There was no such wave. The inference is that the most intensely committed separatists recognized the political futility, not necessarily of separatism per se, but of the use of terror tactics as a means to that end.

The Subsidence of U.S. Terrorism

Before 1975 there are no consistent annual data on numbers of terrorist attacks and casualties

in the United States. Nonetheless, the data in Table 2, compiled by the second author from *The New York Times Index*, provide a 1960s baseline against which to assess later trends. Clandestine attacks by Klansmen and other white supremacists on blacks and civil rights workers in the American South began in the late 1950s and peaked in the early 1960s when civil rights marches and voter registration campaigns were at their peak. They declined during the mid to late 1960s, thanks in part to active prosecution initiated or encouraged by the U.S. department of justice during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Terrorist attacks by black militants on white civilians and police, on the other hand, escalated after 1966; the figures do not include deaths in ghetto rioting. Beginning in 1968 there was a rash of bombings and other attacks by militants opposed to the draft and U.S. involvement in Vietnam. On average about seventy-five terrorist "events" occurred each year between 1963 and 1970, based on a single journalistic source which unquestionably did not include every such incident known to police. Injuries averaged forty-six per year during this period, deaths fourteen.

The longer-run trends are shown in Table 3, including the 1960s baseline and annual data from 1975 to 1986. The FBI's data indicate that during the last decade nonpolitical bombings in the United States were more than ten times as common as incidents with political objectives and targets. Some nonterrorist bombings were committed for monetary

Table 2 Terrorism in the United States, 1963–1970[a]

	June 1963 to Dec 1965	Jan 1966 to June 1968	July 1968 to Dec 1970
White supremacist attacks against blacks and civil rights workers:			
Number reported	160	77	31
Reported injuries	54	34	20
Reported deaths	19	11	6
Black activists' attacks on whites and shootouts with police:			
Number reported	4	28	60
Reported injuries	0	5	127
Reported deaths	0	3	49
Anti-war and anti-establishment bombings and arson:			
Number reported	0	0	125
Reported injuries	0	0	61
Reported deaths	0	0	4
Annual averages, all above types:			
Number reported	66	41	86
Reported injuries	22	16	83
Reported deaths	8	6	24

a. These data were collected by the second author from the New York Times Index. The first category includes clandestine bombings, arson, shootings, beatings, and major cross-burning incidents but excludes mob attacks and riots. The second category similarly excludes violent acts during ghetto riots. The data on events and injuries are presumed to be incomplete because news sources, including the New York Times, underreport minor episodes.

Table 3 Bombings and Terrorism in the U.S. and Puerto Rico 1960s–1986

	All Bombings[a]			Incidents of Political Terrorism[b]	
	Number	Killed		Number	Killed
Annual Mean, 1969-70	4262	nd	Annual Mean, 1963-70	74	14
1975	2074	69		129[c]	6[d]
1976	1570	50		116[c]	nd
1977	1318	22		111	nd
1978	1301	18		69	5
1979	1220	22		52	8
1980	1249	34		29	1
1981	1142	30		42	1
1982	795	16		51	7
1983	687	12		31	6
1984	803	6		13[e]	0
1985	848	28		7[e]	2
1986	858	14		17	1
Annual Mean, 1981-86	856	18		27	2.8

a. For 1969-70, an annual average from data on all actual and attempted bombings including incindiaries, as reported to the U.S. Senate, Riots, Civil and Criminal Disorders, Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Government Operations, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, Part 24, 1970, p. 5342. For 1975-84, all bombings and attempts, including incindiaries, known to the FBI, as reported in Uniform Crime Reports Bomb Summary 1984, p. 3. For 1985-86, all bombings and attempts from an FBI news release of May 23, 1987.

b. The 1963-70 data are from Table 2, above. Subsequent data derive directly or indirectly from the FBI's Terrorist Research and Analytical Center's annual reports, FBI Analysis of Terrorist Incidents in the United States, 1981 to 1986 (with title variations). On the FBI's definition of terrorism see note 31.

c. National Governors' Association, Domestic Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: author, Emergency Preparedness Project, Center for Policy Research, 1979).

d. J. B. Motley, U.S. Strategy to Counter Domestic Political Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, National Security Affairs Monograph Series 83-2, 1983).

e. The Rand Corporation's chronology of domestic terrorism uses a more inclusive definition than the FBI data. The Rand data for 1984 list fifty-one incidents, including twenty-one abortion clinic bombings, which are not included in the FBI terrorism data even though they are nominally within the scope of the FBI definition. For 1985, when clinic bombings had declined, the Rand data show a total of twenty-four incidents of all kinds, compared with the FBI's seven (from Bruce Hoffman, Terrorism in the United States and the Potential Threat to Nuclear Facilities [Santa Monica, CA: Rand R-3351-DOE, 1986], p. 4).

gain, revenge, or intimidation. Others can be labeled pathological because they were committed for personal satisfactions in displays of animosity, mischief, or vandalism. Only the small residue of acts committed for social and political purposes is of interest here. It is nonetheless significant that both terrorist incidents and nonterrorist bombings trace similar long-run trends. Nonterrorist bombings in the mid 1980s averaged about 800 per year, one-fifth their 1969–70 level. Incidents of political terrorism declined by a ratio of about nine to one between 1975 and the mid 1980s. And deaths from political terrorism, the most salient indicator of its intensity, declined from a peak of twenty-four per year in the late 1960s to less than three per year in the 1980s.[31]

Why the general pattern of decline? Apprehension played a *prima facie* role. The FBI and many urban police forces gave increased attention to surveillance of radicals in the 1960s and early 1970s. Reports of antiterrorist actions by the FBI and local police since then document their success in infiltrating militant organizations, preempting attacks, and arresting terrorists of every political stripe. The Black Liberation Army, established in 1971 by ex-convicts and embittered former members of the Black Panthers, was responsible for about twenty ambushes of police officers; by 1974, eighteen of its members were in prison, and only a handful of subsequent events were attributed to the survivors.[32] In 1983–84 the United Freedom Front claimed responsibility for some ten bombings of corporate and military targets in the New York City area. All its seven known members were arrested in 1984 and 1985.[33] Arrests and convictions have similarly put an end to, or substantially inhibited, the terrorist actions of Puerto Rican nationalists in the continental U.S., anti-Soviet terrorism by the Jewish Defense League, and the violent activities of the Aryan Nations and similar right-wing extremist groups.

The FBI's consistent recent record of arrests of terrorists presumably has a generalized deterrent effect as well. Militants who might otherwise use terrorist means probably think the risks and costs are greater now than in the past. Deterrence may also help explain one of the most remarkable facts about international terrorism. While attacks overseas on American officials, military personnel, businessmen, and tourists averaged 200 per year in the early 1980s,[34] there is no reliable evidence that any international revolutionary groups or left-wing foreign regimes have successfully promoted or sponsored any acts of terrorism against American citizens in the United States.[35]

We also think that there has been a precipitous decline in the actual and potential political capabilities of terrorist groups in the United States. This is principally the result of backlash. The practitioners of political terrorism since the late 1960s, whatever their cause—radical change in the status of black Americans, an end to American militarism and imperialism, independence for Puerto Rico, supremacy of the white race—have been reviled and condemned repeatedly and consistently by public officials and the mass media. Moreover, political activism on behalf of these causes has suffered more reverses than gains, in part because the use of terrorism on their behalf has helped discredit the purposes of many nonviolent activists in the eyes of officials and the larger public. This can be related to the larger cycle of political change that Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., has detected in the American political experience from "private interest" to "public purpose" and back.[36]

The 1960s were a time when public purposes prevailed, a time of rapid political change, induced by pressures from below but equally encouraged by the willingness of national leaders to commit themselves and public resources to change. In such periods of rapid

political change growing numbers of activists become convinced that all political ends are possible, and some of them that any means are justifiable in the pursuit of these ends. The reaction to the rhetoric, disorder, and violence of this era was crystallized in the election of Richard Nixon in 1968. In the years that followed, Americans became increasingly preoccupied with the pursuit of private interests. The "me decade" of the 1970s was a period of political consolidation and retrenchment, accompanied by widespread public opposition to the advocacy of radical social change and sharp resentment against groups making extreme demands and using disruptive or violent tactics. In short, it has been very difficult for militants in the 1970s and 1980s to establish constituencies in support of radical change, especially on the left but also on the right, and the use of violent means has almost invariably proven a liability. A succession of small groups of radicals has tested the waters during this period, and each has learned the bitter lesson that the ocean of public support in which they hoped to swim was a mirage. A closer examination of the recent history of the revolutionary left provides evidence for the general thesis.

Information on seven revolutionary terrorist groups which were active in the United States between 1970 and the mid 1980s is shown in Table 4.[37] Only the Weather Underground reportedly had more than fifty members, and, with the exception of the Revolutionary Armed Task Force (RATF), none of their campaigns lasted more than four years. Moreover, the trend over time is toward smaller groups and briefer campaigns, again with the exception of the RATF. And all these organizations together carried out fewer actions than Quebec separatists in Canada. An examination of the fate of several of the groups shows that preemption and declining political capabilities had much to do with their demise.

The Weather Underground was the lineal descendent of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), which was founded in 1959 as an alliance of students, blacks (who soon left), and peace groups intent on influencing the politics of the Democratic Party. Radicalized by the Vietnam War, the SDS split in 1969 into various factions, one of which became the Weathermen, later the Weather Underground. Its leadership, the Weather Bureau, failed in its efforts to transform the SDS into a mass revolutionary movement and by December 1969 decided that mass revolutionary tactics were not a viable strategy in the United States.

Shortly thereafter the Weather Bureau purged approximately three-quarters of the membership and went underground. The new strategy was to organize communes called "focals" to carry out urban guerrilla warfare. About forty members led by Katherine Boudin, Cathlyn P. Wilkerson, Bernadine Dohrn, Jeffrey Jones, and William Ayers decided to form an elite paramilitary organization and in June 1970 began a campaign of bombings directed at corporate offices, New York City police headquarters, the national Capitol (March 1, 1971), and the Pentagon (May 19, 1972). A 1974 pamphlet from *Prairie Fire*, their in-house publication, claimed credit for nineteen bombings during the previous five years. In 1975, however, a "weather inversion" took place, and terrorism was officially abandoned by the majority faction in favor of peaceful political organizing.

Preemption had little or nothing to do with the end of terrorism by the Underground because all of its activists escaped arrest during 1970–74. Organized as a series of separate cells, intensively screening and weeding out members, and enjoying sympathetic support from the then-large leftist community, the Underground operated with a degree of security enjoyed by few of its successors. The loss of political capability was crucial to the end of

Table 4 Revolutionary Terrorist Campaigns in the United States

Organization	Approximate Membership	Terrorist Campaigns: Began	Actions[a]	Ended	Fate of Group
Weather Underground[b]	250	1970	19	1974	Factional split
Revolutionary Armed Task Force[c]	less than 50	1976	20-30	1985	Key members arrested
Symbionese Liberation Army[d]	12	1973	4	1974	Members killed or arrested
New World Liberation Front[e]	40?	1974	40-70	1978	Shift away from terrorism
George Jackson Brigade[f]	less than 10	1976		1978	Members arrested
United Freedom Front[g]	7	1982	10	1984	Members arrested

a. Violent acts claimed by the group or, in the case of the Task Force and some of the Liberation Front actions, attributed to it by police and the FBI. Some of the actions by the Task Force, the Symbionese Liberation Army, and the George Jackson Brigade were robberies rather than politically-targeted actions.

b. From sources summarized by Nicholas Strinkowski, "The Organizational Behavior of Revolutionary Groups" (Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1985), pp. 119-20. Membership included 200 "active supporters" plus an estimated fifty members of underground cells.

c. From the sources cited in Table 3, notes b and e. The RATF was a coalition between surviving members of the Black Liberation Army (see text) and a faction of the Weather Underground. It carried out actions in the names of the Red Guerrilla Resistance, Armed Resistance Unit, and Revolutionary Fighting Group.

d. From Trick, note 32, pp. 519-20. The actions included two robberies.

e. From ibid., p. 520, supplemented by our information from other sources.

f. From J. Bowyer Bell and Ted Robert Gurr, "Terrorism and Revolution in America," in Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1979), p. 337.

g. From Hoffman (Table 3, note e), pp. 32-33.

terrorism. By 1975 it was evident that the Underground had lost the support of most of the nonviolent left. American involvement in Vietnam had ended for reasons that had nothing to do with symbolic bombings. Within the cells burnout became a critical factor, perhaps in

part because of strategic failure but more immediately because of resentment against the extraordinary discipline and demands imposed on members by the leadership. Many early members reacted against these conditions and fled the organization, while few new recruits were found.[38] After 1975 only an East Coast faction remained underground, carrying out few if any political actions.

In 1979 a few East Coast Weather people joined forces with survivors of the Black Liberation Army in an alliance which came to be called the Revolutionary Armed Task Force (RATF). The Task Force was concerned mainly with robberies to raise funds for the organization: its New York unit was thought to have gotten $1 million from bank robberies between 1976 and 1981. While the RATF and affiliated groups had a more extensive underground and above ground support network than any revolutionary organization since the heydey of the Weather Underground, it did not carry out any coherent or visible campaign of political violence. Its existence as a distinct group did not even come to light until a bungled armed truck robbery in 1981. Subsequent arrests between 1981 and 1985 seemed to have put the RATF out of business.[39]

In 1973–74 the Symbionese Liberation Army enjoyed a brief but spectacular career that attracted more media and political attention than any revolutionary group of the era other than the Weather Underground itself. The SLA, like the RATF, brought together white radicals of middle class origin and black ex-convicts. The SLA advocated the unity in love of all oppressed people, redistribution of capital, and the dismantling of the prison system. The SLA's first revolutionary action was the 1973 murder of Oakland's black superintendent of schools, Marcus Foster, because he had cooperated with police in planning a school identity card system. This was followed by the February 1974 kidnapping and conversion of Patty Hearst. In May 1974 six SLA members died in a fiery shootout with the Los Angeles police. Patty Hearst and two other members, William and Emily Harris, drifted through the underground until September 1975 when they were captured in San Francisco.[40]

At the outset of the SLA's campaign the Weather Underground and Black Liberation Army offered verbal support. But the final judgment of the left was negative. The SLA's political obituary appeared in *Ramparts* magazine before the fatal shootout in Los Angeles: "the SLA is a self appointed vigilante group. Its authority derives from no source outside its own will." The article went on to offer a diagnosis that is applicable to other revolutionary groups of the period.

> The SLA's emergence is directly attributable to the collapse of the organized left at the end of the sixties, and its continuing failure to regroup itself and survive. In periods of demoralization, such acts of desperate violence are often conceived as protests against inaction itself, and vigilante groups like the SLA see themselves as substitutes for the missing mass organization. The very presence of a mass movement acts as a restraint on destructive violence, since it creates a moral community in revolt.[41]

By the mid 1970s there was no "moral community in revolt" nor any reliable shelter for revolutionary terrorists from police surveillance outside of localized radical communities on the west and east coasts. The California-based New World Liberation Front was the only marginally successful group of this period, "successful" in the sense that it carried out a four-year campaign of bombings against corporate targets, mainly in the San Francisco area,

without apprehension of its members. In 1978 it announced the suspension of the bombing campaign as it reevaluated tactics, a tacit admission of political impotence. The George Jackson Brigade, active at the same time in Oregon and Washington, was a handful of white radicals whose collective name invoked the memory of a militant black inmate killed in prison. Their short-lived campaign of bank robberies and bombings against corporate targets ended in a series of arrests. The 1982–84 campaign of the United Freedom Front in the New York area, mentioned above, had the same conclusion.[42]

Preemption through arrests was the immediate cause of decline in revolutionary terrorism in the United States. The surveillance and information which made those arrests possible was the result of broader political changes which eliminated virtually all public support and potential recruits for revolutionary movements in the United States.

Comparisons and Conclusions

The aggregate trends in terrorism in Canada and the U.S. during the last twenty-five years have only a superficial similarity. Waves of terrorism peaked in both societies in the early 1960s. In Canada they were a manifestation of localized but long-standing religious zealotry by a Doukhobor sect. In the U.S., by contrast, they were the instrument of extreme white resistance to a major and far-reaching social movement for black equality. The next and more substantial waves of terrorism in the two societies coincided only approximately in time and duration. Quebec separatism was the most fundamental issue of political conflict in Canada in this period and perhaps in this century; its violent phase began abruptly in 1963 and ended by 1972. The upsurge of terrorism in the United States which began in the later 1960s emerged out of not one but three separate issues: the frustration of militant blacks over slow progress on civil rights, student opposition to American militarism, and Puerto Rican nationalism. Black terrorism ended by 1973, coincident with the end of violent separatism in Quebec, whereas abortive campaigns of revolutionary terrorism were still being attempted in the mid 1980s. Violent nationalism on behalf of Puerto Rican independence, not analyzed in this paper, peaked in the continental United States in 1975–78 and ended in 1982 but persists in Puerto Rico.[43]

There is somewhat more similarity in the minor upsurge of terrorism which occurred in the early 1980s in both countries. Right-wing extremists were partly responsible, including the Aryan Nations and similar groups in the U.S. and the Western Guard and the Klan in Canada. Canada also experienced small campaigns of terrorism by issue-oriented left-wing groups like Direct Action which shared internationalist commitments of U.S. groups like the United Freedom Front.

The most pronounced similarities between the two countries are to be found in the dynamics of the two major terrorist movements which we have examined in detail. The FLQ and revolutionary terrorists in the United States both hived off larger political movements because of militants' impatience with the lack or slowness of change achieved by conventional means. In each country the terrorist groups in their initial stages enjoyed some public support and thus were able to persist and attract new recruits despite security countermeasures. In each instance, however, they lost political capabilities because of tactical misjudgments and larger political changes beyond their control. The Cross and

Laporte kidnappings crystallized public opposition to the FLQ in a way roughly analogous to the corrosive effects of Weather Underground bombings and the SLA's kidnapping of Patty Hearst on support for revolutionary action among the American left.

Simultaneously there was movement toward resolution of the issues which had given rise to terrorism. In Quebec a legitimate separatist party, the PQ, made electoral gains and eventually attracted the support of most ex-FLQ activists. In the United States the parallel development was the end of the draft and of American involvement in the Vietnam War. Former antiwar activists joined the forces of reform within the Democratic Party, which culminated in the 1972 presidential nomination of George McGovern. Ideological arguments for continued opposition still had adherents in both countries—the quest for complete separation of French Canada and for revolutionary transformation of capitalist America—but clear and present grievances had diminished, and with them most of the latent political support on which the terrorist groups had capitalized at their birth.

Nothing in our analysis suggests that either society has been immunized against future campaigns of domestic terrorism. In Canada there is a continuing potential for resurgence of terrorism by the Sons of Freedom Doukhobors, many of whom are in jail but will one day be released. In Quebec the voters rejection of the PQ's 1980 referendum on provincial autonomy did not resolve the issue for all time. In April 1987 the Liberal government of Quebec accepted Canada-wide constitutional reforms which were endorsed in July by some 80 percent of the members of the Quebec national assembly, but with the opposition of some separatists. Whether the political situation remains peaceful will depend on acceptance of the reforms by other provinces and the intensity of opposition within Quebec to the agreement. Kelly and Mitchell have suggested that if separatist terrorism does reemerge it will differ markedly in tactics and targets from that which occurred in the 1960s and probably be more deadly.[44]

Potentially the most explosive source of political violence and terrorism in the United States is the increasing separation between mainstream society and badly educated and underemployed black, Chicano, and Latino youth. The urban ghettos are a febril seedbed for every variety of individual deviance and interpersonal violence and, potentially, for violent political action which might emerge out of gang violence. A substantial minority of Puerto Ricans continue to support independence for the island, which will undoubtedly be a source of some future terrorism there and possibly among *Puertorriqueños* on the mainland.

There is also the recurring prospect of terrorism being used to promote narrowly based social demands in both societies. Bombings of abortion clinics in the United States and of pornography shops in British Columbia are recent manifestations of this phenomenon. So is violence by some opponents of nuclear power and advocates of environmental protection. In 1986–87 the principal source of FBI concern about terrorism was armed right-wing groups which invoke fundamentalist and racial justifications for the use of violence in self-defense against authorities.

Neither Canada nor the United States is now directly threatened by international terrorism, but they are influenced by it in ways beyond the control of authorities. As Redlick observes:

> Since the colonial liberation struggles of the fifties, certain modes of violence have become acceptable methods for correcting perceived social injustice and have permeated the international milieu. The penetration of society by the thoughts and acts of radicals has given the use of

> violence and the resort to revolution an "aura of legitimacy" that has not existed for decades. Although an international flow of revolutionary ideas is not a new phenomenon, its extent, degree, and speed have been increased significantly as a result of modern communications and technology.[45]

The consequence in North America has been to make terrorism seem justifiable and acceptable to groups with a variety of grievances. The failure and loss of political capabilities of specific movements which have used terrorism do not teach a universal lesson. New generations of activists with new causes may ignore or be ignorant of the outcomes of previous terrorist campaigns.

One current conflict which could lead to terrorism in either or both societies is the reawakened nationalism of native peoples. Native activists in both countries have voiced increasingly strident demands for autonomy and compensation and some have carried out disruptive protest. In Canada seven terrorist attacks were carried out between 1974 and 1983 in the name of indigenous peoples. In late 1981 some Indians warned the Canadian federal government of "IRA-type strikes" if their demands were not met, and the following July a spokesman for the Assembly of First Nations threatened violence and revolution if indigenous needs continued to be ignored.[46] It is also possible that long-term economic stagnation, whether national or localized, could set in motion a process of alienation, political radicalism, and terrorism among underemployed youth of either country. There is a largely forgotten history of terrorism in labor conflicts in North America.[47] The possibility that economic crisis might lead to terrorism follows less from historical antecedents, though, than from the analysis of extremist groups in Germany and Italy in the 1960s and 1970s, where many individuals set out on a radical path that led them to terrorism as a result of personal dissociation from society and extreme dissatisfaction over lack of meaningful educational and economic opportunities.[48] If terrorism over either nativist or economic issues begins in either Canada or the U.S., it is likely to find an interested audience of potential users in the other.

NOTES

1. On trends in international terrorism see Bonnie Cordes et al., *Trends in International Terrorism* (Santa Monica: Rand R-3183-SL, 1984). The definition is from Edward F. Mickolus, "International Terrorism," in Michael Stohl, ed., *The Politics of Terrorism*, 2nd ed. (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1983), pp. 222–23.

2. A popular conspiracy theory is Claire Sterling, *The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1981).

3. Franco Ferracuti, "Ideology and Repentance: Terrorism in Italy," paper presented to the Interdisciplinary Research Conference on the Psychology of Terrorism, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., March 16–18, 1987.

4. Jeffrey Ian Ross, "Domestic Political Terrorism in Canada 1960–1985: A Statistical and Critical Analysis," paper presented to the 1987 Meetings of the Canadian Political Science Association, Hamilton, June 6, 1987.

5. Padraig O'Malley, *The Uncivil Wars* (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1983), pp. 318–19.

6. Ross; Ted Robert Gurr, "Political Terrorism in the U.S.: Historical Antecedents and Contemporary Trends," in Michael Stohl, ed., *The Politics of Terrorism*, 3rd ed. (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1988), pp. 549–78.

7. The most similar cases strategy in comparative analysis is proposed by Arend Lijphart, "The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research," *Comparative Political Studies*, 7 (July 1975), 158–77. On historical parallels between the two societies see Louis Hartz, "A Comparative Study of Fragment Cultures," in Hugh Davis Graham and

Ted Robert Gurr, eds., *Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives*, 2nd ed. (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979), pp. 119–32.

8. Compare Graham and Gurr, eds., *Violence in America*, with Judy Torrance, *Public Violence in Canada, 1867–1982* (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1986).

9. Seymour Martin Lipset, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution* (New York: Basic Books, 1968), and "Canada and the United States: The Cultural Dimension," in Charles Doran and John H. Sigler, eds., *Canada and the United States: Enduring Friendship, Persistent Stress* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1985), pp. 109–60.

10. Alex P. Schmid, *Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1983), pp. 110–11, quotation p. 110.

11. Ibid., p. 111.

12. On the social psychology of terrorist groups see Martha Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Political Terrorism," in Margaret G. Hermann, ed., *Political Psychology: Contemporary Problems and Issues* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1986), pp. 379–413; and Jerrold M. Post, "The Psycho-Logic of Terror: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces," in Walter Reich, ed., *The Psychology of Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: The Wilson Center Press, forthcoming).

13. James W. Clarke finds that almost all of the sixteen people who attempted presidential assassinations in the United States, even if mentally deranged and acting individually, took their cues from the political issues and passions of their time. *American Assassins: The Darker Side of Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).

14. See Thomas H. Mitchell, "Politically-Motivated Terrorism in North America: The Threat and the Response" (Ph.D. diss., Carleton University, 1985), p. 17.

15. See for example Raymond R. Corrado with Rebecca Evans, "Ethnic and Ideological Terrorism in Western Europe," in Stohl, ed., *The Politics of Terrorism*.

16. For a generalized version of this argument see Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), ch. 6 and 7.

17. See Andrew Mack, "The Utility of Terrorism," *Australia and New Zealand Journal of Criminology*, 14 (1981), 200–03.

18. For a conceptual argument and evidence on the crucial importance of political capabilities for enhancing the international power of "weak" states like Israel and Vietnam, see A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), ch. 2.

19. Kenneth McRoberts and Dale Postgate, *Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis*, rev. ed. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1984).

20. James W. Button, *Black Violence: Political Impact of the 1960s Riots* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).

21. Two other events were carried out by security personnel acting as *agents provocateurs*, while six events could not be categorized.

22. See Simma Holt, *Terrorism in the Name of God* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1964), and George Woodcock and Ivan Avakumovic, *The Doukhobors* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977). Thomas H. Mitchell, a Canadian authority on terrorism, suggested in a personal communication that violence by the Sons of Freedom should be regarded as religious communal violence rather than terrorism because it was targeted mainly against members of their own community. Our analysis shows that, contrary to common impressions, the primary target in fifty-seven of 130 attacks attributed to the Freedomites was a public building or a power, communication, or transportation facility. Commercial buildings were attacked in sixteen other instances, community buildings in seventeen. This targeting pattern, juxtaposed with the Sons of Freedom's doctrine of resistance to any external authority, secular or religious, is for us unambiguous evidence that their acts constituted a campaign of terrorism with political objectives.

23. See William D. Coleman, *The Independence Movement in Quebec 1945–1980* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), for a detailed discussion of the separatist movement.

24. On the origins and actions of the FLQ see Louis Fournier, *FLQ: The Anatomy of an Underground Movement* (Toronto: NC Press, 1984), and Gustav Morf, *Terror in Quebec* (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1970).

25. In September 1964 Vallières and Gagnon founded Révolution Québecoise, a Marxist and proindependence magazine. The next year they secretly joined the FLQ. Late in 1966, while jailed in New York, Vallières wrote *Nègres Blanc d'Amérique*, later translated as *White Niggers of America* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1972), which was widely influential among revolutionaries in Quebec and elsewhere.

26. Carole De Vault and William Johnson, *The Informer: Confessions of an Exterrorist* (Scarborough: Fleet Publishers, 1982).

27. James Stewart, *The FLQ: Seven Years of Terrorism* (Montreal: Montreal Star in cooperation with Simon and Schuster of Canada, 1970).

28. Fournier, p. 281.

29. Mitchell, p. 143. He also points out that scandals and accusations of incompetence centered on the ruling Liberal Party in Quebec also contributed to the PQ victory.

30. Pierre Vallières, *Choose!* (Toronto: New Press, 1972), p. 116.

31. Since 1982 the FBI's working definition of a "terrorist incident" is "a violent act or act dangerous to human life in violation of the criminal laws . . . to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives." This definition is from the FBI's Terrorist Research and Analytical Center's annual reports, *FBI Analysis of Terrorist Incidents in the United States* (with title variations) for 1981 through 1986. Before 1982 the data refer to "claimed terrorist incidents." Since 1982 the data specifically exclude "terrorist related incidents" such as robberies by extremist groups; it is likely but not certain that they were excluded before 1982 also.

32. Robert Daley, *Target Blue* (New York: Delacorte Press, 1973); Marcia McKnight Trick, "Chronology of Incidents of Terroristic, Quasi-Terroristic, and Political Violence in the United States, January 1965 to March 1976," in National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, *Disorders and Terrorism: Report of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Department of Justice, 1976), pp. 509–10.

33. Bruce Hoffman, *Terrorism in the United States and the Potential Threat to Nuclear Facilities* (Santa Monica: Rand, R-3351-DOE, 1986), pp. 32–33.

34. From U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, *Domestic Security Measures Relating to Terrorism*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights on Domestic Security Measures Relating to Terrorism, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, Serial No. 51, 1984, pp. 55–79. The data are from annual reports of the U.S. State Department on international terrorism, from which we exclude hoaxes and threats.

35. A handful of foreign students and emigrés in the United States have been attacked by agents of regimes which they opposed. Before the 1979 Iranian revolution the Shah's secret service, the SAVAK, used terror tactics against prorevolutionary Iranian students in the United States. In 1980–81 two anti-Qadhafi Libyan students in Colorado and Utah were shot, one of them fatally, which led to the arrest and expulsion of Libyan agents. In 1984 Henry Lui of Los Angeles, a U.S. citizen who had written material offensive to the Chinese Kuomintang regime, was murdered, allegedly by Chinese agents; see Mark Downie and Joel Milman, "A Brazen Act of Terrorism: The Killing of Henry Lui," *Mother Jones* (May 1985), 16–23ff. The most thoroughly documented case was the September 1976 assassination of Orlando Letelier, Chilean foreign minister in Salvador Allende's regime, in Washington, D.C. Agents of the Pinochet regime's secret service, DINA, including Cuban exiles and Michael Townley, an American resident of Chile, planted a car bomb which killed both Letelier and an American coworker, Ronni Moffitt; see John Dinges and Saul Landau, *Assassination on Embassy Row* (New York: Pantheon, 1980). None of these events has any semblance to scenarios of international revolutionaries' bringing terrorism home to America.

36. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *The Cycles of American History* (Boston: Houston, Mifflin, 1986).

37. A number of names other than those in Table 4 have been used in communiqués claiming credit for acts of revolutionary terrorism. All the groups listed here were more or less cohesive and persistent groups or networks of affiliated groups. Several of them, including the Revolutionary Armed Task Force, the New World Liberation Front, and the United Freedom Front, carried out actions under several names. Moreover, there were continuities in membership among some of the groups. A few survivors of the Symbionese Liberation Army are believed to have joined or helped form the New World Liberation Front, while the Revolutionary Armed Task Force (as noted in the text) included veterans of the Weather Underground.

38. This material is drawn mainly from Nicholas Strinkowski, "The Organizational Behavior of Revolutionary Groups" (Ph.D. diss., Northwestern University, 1985).

39. See Hoffman, pp. 28–32.

40. Robert Brainard Pearsall, *The Symbionese Liberation Army* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1974); Vin McLelland, *The Voices of Guns* (New York: Putnam, 1977).

41. "The Symbionese Liberation Army: Terrorism and the Left," *Ramparts*, 12 (May 1974), 24, 27.

42. From Hoffman; Trick; and annual reports of the FBI Terrorist Research and Analytical Center.

43. For summary analyses of violent Puerto Rican nationalism see Gurr, "Political Terrorism in the United States," pp. 549–78; and Hoffman, pp. 7–11.

44. Michael J. Kelly and Thomas H. Mitchell, "Post Referendum Quebec—The Potential for Conflict," *Conflict Quarterly*, 1 (1980), 15–19.
45. Amy Sands Redlick, "The Transnational Flow of Information as a Cause of Terrorism," in Yonah Alexander, David Carlton, and Paul Wilkinson, eds., *Terrorism: Theory and Practice* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979), p. 76.
46. *Toronto Star*, Nov. 5, 1981, A14; July 23, 1982, A10. See also Maurice Tugwell, "Low Intensity Violence in Canada: The Myth, the Reality and the Prospects," *Laurentian University Review*, 14 (November 1981), 55–67.
47. See Philip Taft and Philip Ross, "American Labor Violence: Its Causes, Character, and Outcome," in Graham and Gurr, eds., pp. 187–241.
48. See Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Political Terrorism."