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The Rise and Fall of Québécois Separatist Terrorism: A Qualitative Application of Factors from Two Models

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During the 1960s and early 1970s, there was a rise in oppositional political terrorism in Québec committed by individuals and organizations that wanted the province to separate from the rest of Canada. This situation provides an excellent case study that demonstrates the phenomenon that many of the same factors that lead to the rise of terrorism also cause its decline.

Canada, compared to most Western countries, has experienced a rather low level of oppositional political terrorism.¹ The most notable wave of domestic terrorism was connected to the activities of Québécois separatists. Even though there were a handful of different organizations that claimed responsibility for terrorist actions, the most active was the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ). The FLQ operated primarily between 1962 and 1972 and was responsible for the death of seven people, the injury of several others, countless property damage, the theft of dynamite, and several bank robberies (Ross, 1988).

This article examines why this terrorist movement appeared and why it declined in its activities. More importantly, the article provides a qualitative test of the possibility that the structural causes for oppositional political terrorism can be related to those factors connected to its decline. In other words, there are many complementarities between the conditions leading to the rise and those affecting the decline of terrorism, but they have not been applied to a case study. In particular, variables responsible for decline are in many respects responsible or conceptually related to those important for causation.

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Theoretical Context

Few researchers have developed a general causal model or theory of the structural causes of terrorism. More common are studies that list several possible factors but fail to specify the interactions among them. In a recent model (Ross, 1993), ten variables are identified as being the most important. Three permissive causes are predicted to be from least to most important: geographic location; type of political system; and level of modernization. The seven precipitants are hypothesized to be from least to most important: social, cultural, and historical facilitation; organizational split and development; presence of other forms of unrest; support; counterterrorist organization failure; availability of weapons and explosives; and grievances. The general order of importance for each variable, however, differs for each terrorist group.

Two arguments specifically review the causes of decline. On the one hand, Ross and Gurr (1989) provide a theoretical interpretation for the decline of domestic political terrorism in advanced industrialized societies using Canada and the United States as examples where this phenomenon has occurred. They derive four general kinds of conditions that contribute to the decline of political terrorism: preemption, deterrence, burnout, and backlash. On the other hand, Crenshaw (1987) contends that "explanations of the decline of terrorism must be derived from statements about the causes" of terrorism (p. 1). After a survey of 40 organizations that commit terrorism, she develops three categories of the determinants of decline. According to Crenshaw, three models explain how terrorism ends: defeat, strategic shift, and disintegration for internal purposes. She argues that "[t]hree categories of factors [are] important to these patterns: the background conditions that structure the conflict between government and challenger, the characteristics of the organization practicing terrorism, and the policy response of the government" (p. 12).

In general, both of these treatments fail to comprehensively examine the causes of terrorism, the literature on prevention, and the reasons why other types of political conflicts end. The previous arguments can be extended and qualified in a number of respects. New variables should be examined and integrated with the ones already mentioned by Ross and Gurr and Crenshaw so that a better model or theory can be developed, and hypotheses derived from these efforts should be tested.

In an effort to accomplish this task, the decline of oppositional political terrorism should be seen as a multistage process to which eight factors contribute. Much like the causes of terrorism in general, these variables can be divided between the preconditions and precipitants. Deterrence, accommodation/cooption, and counterterrorist tactics can be considered the preconditions. Death of terrorists, imprisonment, individual burnout, group disintegration, and support impairment are the precipitants for decline. These practices can operate independently and interdependently. In order to provide evidence for both the causal and decline factors they are applied to Québécois separatist terrorism.

Examination of the Causes

The Causes

To begin with, seven basic factors contributed to the rise of Québécois separatist terrorism and counterterrorist organizations: availability of weapons and explosives; organizational split; presence of other forms of unrest; support; counterterrorist organization failure; geographic location; and level of modernization.

Counterterrorist Organizations

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (Montreal police) and Security Service of the US Department of State agencies failed to detect and arrest or apprehend members of the FLQ during the FLQ-Maoist era. In the military during the FLQ-Maoist era, they have been documented in Canada and the United States. They used the United States, to the FLQ" (Fourier, 1993, p. 28).

Presence of Other Forms of Terrorism

The rise of FLQ activity. In April 1963, there was a series of explosions centered on the Solberg company, in Montréal where the company was a warning to Solberg employees that there was a series of explosions with the demand for their firefighters' demonstration organized in the plant. The year before, the Ayers plant, the year before, Unemployment soared to 19.8% and [there were few jobs], graduating from the province of Quebec (Stewart, 1970, p. 4).

In the summer of 1967, the labor movement offered a significant march in support of the strikers at the Ayers plant. During November 1967, a picket line was met a detachment of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Company, Standard
Examination of the Québec Case

The Causes

To begin with, seven basic structural reasons may be articulated to explain the rise of Québécois separatist terrorism. They are, from least to most important: counterterrorist organization failure; presence of other forms of unrest; availability of weapons and explosives; support; social, cultural, and historical facilitation; organizational split and development; and grievances.

Counterterrorist Organization Failure. The Communauté Urbaine du Montréal (Montreal police) and Sureté (the Québec provincial police) were relatively skilled at detecting and arresting suspected terrorists. However, they had a problem with cooperation and exchange of information among themselves. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police–Security Service (RCMP-SS) also failed to take adequate measures against the FLQ in the early years of the organization’s existence. These state agencies failures provided the rationale for the federal government to bring in the military during the so-called October Crisis (Crenlinsk, 1985). Other incidents have been documented such as the arrest of André Girard, an information clerk with the Montreal police, who “was believed to have given police ‘secrets’ to the FLQ” (Fournier, 1984, p. 84).

Presence of Other Forms of Unrest. Increased labor unrest contributed to the rise of FLQ activity. In fact, some FLQ cells, like the Geoffroy network, concentrated their activities on setting off bombs in support of striking workers. As early as May 3, 1963, a bomb was placed in a Place d’Armes office building in Montréal where the corporate office of Solbec Mining Company was located. This was a warning to Solbec to settle its differences with its striking miners. In 1966 there was a series of violent labor disputes. On August 3, for example, 300 employees of Dominion Ayers plywood factory in Lachute went on strike to back their demand for their first collective agreement. A well-attended solidarity demonstration organized in the fall of that year became violent after company guards intervened using clubs and tear gas. The next day the FLQ planted a bomb near the Ayers plant. The year 1968 was also popular for labor disputes and FLQ-related bombings. “After the boom of the pre-Expo years, Québec’s economy hit a slump. Unemployment soared to . . . twice the rate of [neighboring province], Ontario, . . . [and t]here were few j[obs available for the thousands of . . . [students] who would be graduating from the province’s new general and technical colleges (CEGEPs)” (Stewart, 1970, p. 41). During 1968, one of the most violent protests in the history of the labor movement occurred. “On February 27, several thousand demonstrators marched in support of the Seven-Up workers who had been on strike since June 15, 1967. . . . Near the entrance to the bottling plant in Ville Mont-Royal, the marchers met a . . . detachment of police, and the demonstration turned” violent (Fournier, 1984, p. 128). In May, the Geoffroy network planted its first bomb at the Seven-Up plant. During November, FLQ bombs were placed at the Domtar Company, Lord and Company, Standard Structural Steel, Eaton’s Department Store, and govern-
ment liquor stores. All seemed to be connected with strikes. Finally, the FLQ’s kidnapping of James Cross and Pierre Laporte was probably inspired by the successful use of this technique by several Latin-American guerrilla and terrorist groups operating during this time (Redlick, 1979).

Availability of Weapons and Explosives. The accessibility of explosives, and readily available information on the construction of bombs and terrorist techniques also contributed to the rise of the FLQ. Dynamite and detonators were available from the construction sites for the Montréal Metro (subway), Expo ‘67, and the Laurentian Autoroute. Alternatively, these materials were taken from quarries at South Stukely, Saint-Bruno-de-Montarville, Saint Hilaire, and Laval. During the building or maintenance of these sites dynamite and detonators were poorly guarded and in such large quantity that thefts were not immediately noticeable (Fournier, 1984).

The construction of bombs and explosives was aided through articles published in La Cognée, the first official organ of the FLQ. It appeared in October 1963 and stopped publication in April 1967. With some exceptions, it was printed twice a month and sometimes had a circulation over 3,000; it provided information about possible kinds of sabotage, how to handle arms and explosives, how to make Molotov cocktails, and different ways of setting fires (Fournier, 1984, p. 46). La Victoire, the second official FLQ news organ, started publication in November 1967 and was published intermittently until the summer of 1968. In its very first issue, La Victoire printed “instructions and diagrams showing how to make a variety of bombs... Activists were [also] encouraged to acquire light weapons, such as the semi-automatic M-1 .30 calibre rifle, preferably from the U.S., where their sale was legal in most states.” It also gave information on outdoor survival techniques (Fournier, 1984, p. 118).

Support. A variety of constituencies supported the FLQ. Domestically many workers and students supported the Québécois separatist organizations. Support came not only domestically but internationally. In particular, aid came from the Cuban and Algerian governments and other foreign radical movements and terrorist groups.

The FLQ received help from the Cuban government and the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), the revolutionary party in power in Algeria. In the autumn of 1965, a number of Québécois separatists who engaged in terrorist acts met Julia Gonzalaz, the Cuban Consul in Montréal, “who was not only a Guevarist, but a supporter of independence for Québe” (Fournier, 1984, p. 93). FLQ leaders allegedly traveled to Cuba (Barron, 1974, p. 154), and the release of James Cross was arranged with the help of the Cuban government. Moreover, a majority of the FLQ who escaped custody fled to Cuba and were given political asylum there during the 1960s and early 1970s. Some of the other members of the FLQ fled to Algeria. For example, the July 15, 1964 issue of La Cognée published “A message from Algiers,” signed by Gilles Pruneau, an “FLQ activist who had gone into voluntary exile... He wrote that he had made contact, on behalf of the FLQ with...” FLN officials in the Algerian interior du FLQ in Algiers, and was given boxes of petrol bombs and dynamite that were allegedly sent from Algiers. Bulletin des observations has reported that, “In 1971, the FLQ’s Défi du Monde” added that the FLQ was now in a position to carry out terrorist activities.

Sympathetic radical organizations in other countries either helped or received training from the FLQ. It started during the summer of 1966, networking in the United States and Canada. Charette and Alain Allard reported that members “from the radical wing of the FLQ” (Fournier, 1984, p. 11) had attended a meeting called by the Committee for Solidarity with the FLQ, “attended the press conference of the FLQ in July 1966,” and “started the work in the United States and Canada.”

We understand the logic of their actions... If these sorts of actions continue, it is essential to begin to take action against the whole international network of anti-imperialist forces.”

Members from the FLQ were also based in Jordan. In June 1970, it was discovered that Normand Roy and Monique Ouellet were operating in Jordan.4

Cultural, Social, and Political Context. The FLQ was part of a constellation of collective protests that sprung up in Montreal in the wake of the 1960s crisis. A number of cultural, social, and political practices initiated by student groups and other anti-establishment groups were periodically pitched against the government and its policies. A number of these activities were carried out by the theoretical and political group, the Collective, which was managed by the theoretical group, the Socialists. In 1964, the Collective published a book, “The Secret of the FLQ,” written by Pierre Vallières, the secretary of the Syndicat des étudiants, a group of young radicals who led the strike that year. The book was published by the Syndicat des étudiants, “the secretary of the FLQ at the time of the FLQ strike in Montréal, ... and was based on secret conversations...” The book was a bestseller and was widely read in Montreal. It was also translated into several languages and was reprinted in several other countries. It was widely read in Montreal and was widely distributed. It was widely read in Montreal and was widely distributed. It was widely read in Montreal and was widely distributed.
with... the... FLN” (Fournier, 1984, p. 68). In mid-October 1970, the “Délégation exterior du FLQ in Algeria” published their first in a series of information bulletins from Algiers. Besides their propaganda efforts, “[i]t also maintained connections with... representatives in Algeria of various national liberation movements such as the IRA and the ETA... the Black Panthers, the Palestinian resistance, and the Vietnamese FNL” (Fournier, 1984, p. 284). Moreover, in late December 1971, the FLQ’s Délégation extérieure in Algeria issued a communiqué announcing that it had been granted official recognition by the FLN. The FLQ in exile was now in a position to receive financial assistance from the FLN.

Sympathetic radical organizations and terrorist groups operating in other countries either helped or influenced the rise of the FLQ. For example, the FLQ received training from the Black Panther party in the United States. The relationship started during the summer of 1966, while Vallières and Charles Gagnon were networking in the United States (Fournier, 1984, p. 108). In March 1969, Pierre Charette and Alain Allard, two FLQ activists, avoided capture by police by escaping to the United States. Black Panthers in Harlem put them in touch with members “from the radical section of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)” (Fournier, 1984, p. 153). On May 5, 1970, Gagnon helped establish a Québec Committee for Solidarity with the Black Panthers. A Panther spokesperson who “attended the press conference announcing the formation of the committee” said:

We understand that Québec is colonized by the same system that confronts us... Our party is not racist, but internationalist, and we think it is essential to link with other liberation struggles to form a worldwide anti-imperialist front (Stewart, 1970, p. 54).

Members from the FLQ also received training from the Palestinian Fedayin. In June 1970, it was discovered that two FLQ activists, who were later identified as Normand Roy and Michel Lambert, were training at a Palestinian Fedayin camp in Jordan.

*Cultural, Social, and Historical Facilitation.* In Québec there has been a tradition of collective protests and violence against real or perceived unjust policies and practices initiated by the English against the French (Coleman, 1984). This conflict periodically pitted the Catholic French majority against the economically powerful Protestant Anglophone minority. The rise of the FLQ was also encouraged by the theoretical guidance of Vallières and Gagnon. Several actions helped the two activists establish themselves as the ideological leaders of the FLQ. In September 1964, Vallières and Gagnon founded *Révolution Québécoise*, a Marxist and proindependence magazine. Vallières, who was 26 at the time, “was also secretary of the Syndicat des journalistes de Montréal (CSN) and one of the leaders of the strike then in progress at *La Presse*” (Fournier, 1984, p. 70). Gagnon, 25, “the secretary of the editorial committee, was a lecturer at the University of Montréal, ... and was very active in the student movement” (Fournier, 1984, p. 70). In 1965, Vallières, Gagnon, and their friends secretly joined the FLQ. They
made contact with individuals publishing *La Cognée*. During the summer of 1966, the police publicly identified Vallières and Gagnon as leaders of an FLQ network and issued warrants for their arrest. Meanwhile, the two were traveling throughout the United States contacting many American revolutionary organizations. On September 26, 1966, however, both of them appeared in New York City "in front of the United Nations headquarters. They began picketing, ... announced that they were going on a 30-day hunger strike to attract the attention of world opinion and to demand political prisoner status for imprisoned FLQ activists" (Fournier, 1984, p. 103). The following day Vallières and Gagnon were arrested. "U.S. Immigration accused them of illegal entry into the United States and suggested that they accept voluntary deportation. They chose instead to fight extradition proceedings and were confined in the Manhattan House of Detention for Men . . . ("The Tombs")" (Fournier, 1984, p. 103). While in jail, Vallières wrote *Nègres Blanc d'Amérique* (*White Niggers of America*). It was a description of his emergence from the poverty, crime, violence, and slums of Montréal and a plea for a "total, multi-national revolution" by the downtrodden, leading to a classless, money-less society of equal and fraternal men (Vallières, 1972a, p. 132). The book was published in Canada, France, the United States, West Germany, Italy, and Mexico. In fact, *Nègres Blanc d'Amérique* "had a greater world-wide circulation than any other revolutionary book published in Québec" (Fournier, 1984, p. 122). The book was an instant success with the Québec left revolutionary movements and student radicals in many countries. In November 1966, while Vallières and Gagnon were in jail, a group of sympathizers consisting of solidarity groups of intellectuals and activists set up the Comité d'Aide au Group Vallières–Gagnon. The group's first aim was to raise money for their legal defense. Meanwhile, Vallières and Gagnon were "successful in their fight against extradition" and remained in prison until January 13, 1967 only to be literally kidnapped by U.S. Immigration officers. They were escorted onto a plane which took . . . them immediately to Montréal, where the RCMP arrested them on arrival" (Fournier, 1984, pp. 103–104). Vallières and Gagnon "appeared in court on January 15 on a dozen charges ranging from murder to bombing attacks" and robbery. It was a "full year before their first trial began" (Fournier, 1984, p. 104). The incident attracted attention both domestically and internationally. There was considerable criticism by labor unions, the Parti Québécois, some Liberal members of the Québec Assembly, the French filmmakers Alan Resnais and Jean-Luc Godard, and the Federation of Human Rights Association over the long incarceration.

*Organizational Split and Development.* The majority of the FLQ were dissatisfied members of the Rassemblement pour l’Indépendance Nationale (RIN) and Action Socialiste Pour l’Indépendance du Québec (ASIQ). One of the most important separatist organizations was the RIN, which began in September 1960. The RIN was a Montréal-based group that advocated a leftist, independent Québec where only one official language (French) would be recognized. A free Québec, according to their plans, would be a neutral, nonnuclear power, with membership in the United Nations. Its borders would remain the same except for the addition of Labrador.

Grievances. During the FLQ split, the ASIQ (Coleman, 1984) and the RIN represented Québecois interests which were not being adequately represented in the province of Canada and which had been frustrated in violent activity against the革新 movement. Frustration with the political participation of the Quebecois within the province of Canada led to the split between the ASIQ and the RIN.

What seems to be the...
the addition of Labrador (Hagy, 1969, p. 232). Another important separatist organization was the ASIQ, formed in August 1960. They characterized "the national liberation struggle in Québec as a . . . stage in the process of decolonization." The solution, according to their leader, Raoul Roy, was "the absolute independence of Québec and the proletarian-national liberation of French Canadians" (Fournier, 1984, p. 18). In November 1962, 24 RIN activists "attended a secret meeting." The "objective was to develop more radical . . . forms of action in the cause of independence. Most [of those who attended] were opposed to violence but prepared to undertake certain forms of direct action: painting slogans on 'colonial symbols' (buildings, mailboxes, etc.); [including] stealing Red Ensigns and Union Jacks, . . . and minor acts of sabotage. They agreed to set up an underground within the RIN. It adopted the name Réseau de Résistance (RR)" (Fournier, 1984, p. 27).

In February 1963, however, George Schoeters, Gabriel Hudon, and Raymond Villeneuve—three members of the RIN, who had met in the context of their activities with the RR—officially started the FLQ. Schoeters, 33, was born in Belgium and did not find the RIN radical enough. Hudon, 23, an industrial draughtsman, had been active in the RIN since 1961, and Villeneuve, 19, who was working in a bakery, was exasperated by the lack of immediate success in both the RIN and the RR. Villeneuve recruited the first members of the FLQ from among his close friends. Most of them were active in the RIN and ASIQ. He, along with Hudon, made contact with the Réseau de Libération Nationale, a recently formed group that joined the FLQ en bloc. Others, such as François Schirm, Daniel Belac, and Pierre Paul Geoffroy, became members of the RIN and were very active in this group for some time. They, like the others, soon decided that the RIN was not revolutionary enough. When they learned about the existence of the FLQ they joined. According to Paul Rose, a former member of the RIN and one of the FLQ members convicted of kidnapping and murdering Pierre Laporte,

the move from the RIN . . . was very gradual. It was a step-by-step thing until I finally reached the point where I became convinced that it was no longer feasible to work openly. . . . We felt ourselves hemmed in on all sides and the only recourse left was to move our operation underground (Charney, 1984, p. 27).

Grievances. During the early 1960s there was a rise in separatist sentiment in Québec (Coleman, 1984; Laurendau, 1974). Adherents of this ideology felt that Québécois interests were not being adequately served by Québec remaining a province of Canada and advocated separation. Individuals who eventually participated in violent activities were dissatisfied with the progress of the separatist movement. Frustration with the political process led to the development of an independent separatist movement. This was inspired in part by the expansion of political participation during the so-called Quiet Revolution (Coleman, 1984).

What seems to be the pattern is that grievances fueled by social, cultural, and
historical factors, i.e., the presence of other forms of unrest, led to organizational splits. Once the terrorist organization or cells were developed, they thrived because of support, antiterrorist organization failure, and the availability of weapons and explosives.

**The Decline**

Only six of the previously mentioned eight variables were important in the decline of Québecois separatist terrorism: deterrence, counterterrorist practices, imprisonment, accommodation/cooptation, individual burnout, and support impairment. Each of these processes will be examined in the context of the FLQ.

**Deterrence.** The arrests of FLQ members between 1970 and 1972 and the publicly noticeable special police units should have deterred a number of supporters in the wider separatist community. Alternative deterrent effects may have been created by new antiterrorist legislation and security measures, including the imposition of the War Measures Act in October 1970.

**Counterterror Tactics.** After the October Crisis, the FLQ was increasingly handicapped by more and improved police and national security practices and never again returned to the routine of the previous years. In early 1971, national security agencies stepped up their surveillance of the FLQ and the whole independence movement. In the early 1970s, the Anti-terrorist Section of the Communauté Urbaine du Montréal (Montréal police) had more informers and agent provocateurs (e.g., De Vault and Johnson, 1982). During the early 1970s, security was increased at Canadian airports as well as at government and corporate buildings and nuclear facilities. The Canadian government also strengthened its legislative and military capabilities for dealing with terrorism with the development of antiterrorism strike forces.

**Imprisonment.** FLQ cells effectively recruited new members and carrying out actions from 1963 through 1971 despite intensive security measures, the arrest, trial, and imprisonment of early members of the FLQ, and in 1968–1969 of Vallières and Gagnon. The implementation of the War Measures Act (October 1970–January 1971), however, led to the detention of 500 persons (including important members of the FLQ) without charge. Among the 20 FLQ members sentenced to prison were those who were responsible for the Laporte kidnapping and murder. Despite these measures some FLQ cells escaped detection and in early 1971 they began to reorganize. A new wave of bombings and support activities (e.g., holdups) began in March 1971 and continued through the fall. On October 4 and 5 of 1971, on the first anniversary of the October crisis, some 60 officers of the Combined Anti-Terrorist Squad carried out a large-scale roundup in Montréal and arrested four FLQ members. The following May the police arrested members of the FLQ's "Saint Henri Network." In June 1972 there were four more arrests. Finally, in November 1972 a police roundup led to the arrest of nearly half of the FLQ cells.

**Accommodation/Cooption.** FLQ members made both actual and potential accommodation: they provided a cover for the disappearance. In mid-1971, the Liberal Lesage government launched the Movement Association (MSA), an organization of the Communist Party and Nationale, a small movement of Québecois separatist intellectuals and a new political party. The MSA was a "leftist" separatist and they had some success.

**Individual Burnout.** The least understood was what appeared to be the "burnout" in December 1971, for which the government announced that it was looking for a "shock group." In fact, after a wave of repressive actions, FLQ members were said, "an FLQ organization was not because of a lack of leadership. They received repressive actions and they dispersed. All they had in common was that they were FLQ." (Revolution, 1972b, p. 116). A number of new FLQ leaders emerged in late 1971 and continued the organization's crimes and offenses. Some denounced it.

**Support Impairment.** Finally, another factor during 1970. The immediate cause was the murder of Laporte and the PQ's denunciation of the FLQ and its support the emergency powers of the government. In early 1970, the PQ came in second in the provincial election of the vote. The PQ's advocates of the struggle for national sovereignty condemned the economic and political violence as "anti-Jean Laporte, "warned impatience, and revolutionary adventure." They called it "a struggle for lives" (Fournier, 1982). The social context was that were unresolvable with legal means.

Thus Laporte's murder, as a result, weakened the FLQ. It helped swing the public opinion toward more conventional methods, away from the PQ as the legitimate political force in the separatist party. In any event, the federal government...
to the arrest of nearly a dozen people suspected of being linked to two FLQ cells.

**Accommodation/Cooptation.** The rise of the separatist Parti Québécois (PQ) drew both actual and potential members of the FLQ, thus contributing to the FLQ’s disappearance. In mid-October 1967, Rene Levesque, a powerful minister in the Liberal Lesage government, left the party to found the Mouvement Souverainiste Association (MSA), a separatist organization. In mid-October 1968, the Ralliement Nationale, a small moderate group, and the MSA held a convention to form a new political party. The party was later called the PQ, Levesque was elected its leader, and it had some 20,000 dues-paying members (Hagy, 1969, p. 236).

**Individual Burnout.** The PQ also attracted members of the FLQ who engaged in what appeared to be increasingly dangerous and irrelevant terrorist activities. In December 1971, for example, Vallières emerged from 3 years in hiding to announce that he was leaving the FLQ and joining the PQ. He argued that the FLQ was a “shock group” whose continued activities would only play into the hands of forces of repression for which it was no match. “There has never been,” he said, “an FLQ organization as such but rather a collection of groups or cells with little or no contact between them, with no guiding nucleus and no real strategy.” All they had in common was their choice of the three letters “FLQ” (Vallierres, 1972b, p. 116). A number of other members followed Vallieres in his break with the FLQ. Similarly, self-exiled members of the FLQ returned to Canada starting in late 1971 and continuing through 1982, and were given light sentences for old offenses. Some denounced “FLQism”; most joined the PQ.10

**Support Impairment.** The political capabilities of the FLQ changed fundamentally during 1970. The immediate consequence of the October Crisis and Laporte’s murder was the loss of public support. Major labor unions in Quebec jointly denounced the FLQ and the general public also seemed to overwhelmingly support the emergency powers and the presence of the army in Quebec. In December 1970, the PQ came in second in the provincial election with seven seats and 23% of the vote. The PQ’s manifesto, issued a year later, proclaimed the need for a struggle for national independence and “social revolution” but also condemned political violence as “humanly immoral and politically pointless.” It pointedly “warned impatient young activists against joining ‘childish cells’ in a ‘fruitless revolutionary adventurism which might cost them their future and even their lives’” (Fournier, 1984, p. 312). In other words, conflicts took place among members that were unresolvable.

Thus Laporte’s murder marked a watershed in the political history of the FLQ. It helped swing public opinion among Quebecois away from the FLQ and toward more conventional forms of political participation. Popular support for the PQ as the legitimate movement for independence increased and contributed to the pro-separatist party’s victory in the 1976 provincial election. On the deterrent side, the federal government’s strong response during the October Crisis left
many Québécois with the feeling that Ottawa would suspend their civil liberties by reimposing the War Measures Act if events in Québec again threatened public order. Moreover, the PQ’s 1976 victory demonstrated that “[t]he struggle for independence did not necessitate acts of terrorism but could take place within the framework of democracy and the rule of the majority” (Mitchell, 1985, p. 143).

Even though there was some support of the FLQ in the international arena by states, their security agencies, and radical organizations, it is difficult to say when, how, and if it was withdrawn.

What seems to be the pattern with the FLQ is that deterrence and accommodation/cooptation led to group disintegration and individual burnout, and antiterrorist tactics contributed to group disintegration, deterrence, individual burnout, and imprisonment; support impairment enhanced the effectiveness of counterterrorist methods, which contributed in turn to individual burnout and group disintegration; and individual burnout and group disintegration reinforced each other.

**Summary**

Before the 1960s nationalist terrorism was practically unheard of in Québec. Thus the emergence of the FLQ caught the police and national security agencies off guard. With time the state developed new and better strategies to deal with the rise of this type of terrorism. Despite state antiterrorist tactics during the early 1960s, the FLQ continued its activities. Since the FLQ had a large constituency, sole reliance on counterterrorist methods by the government proved inadequate. Authorities had to rely on a combination of antiterrorist tactics, group disintegration, and cooptation for the movement to finally subside.

The FLQ had several effects on Québec politics, society, and the independence movement. It gained massive domestic and international publicity for the plight of the Québécois. Moreover, the FLQ left Québécois worried that any Canadian federal government in power would curtail their civil liberties through the imposition of the War Measures Act if it ever felt threatened by Québec again. Furthermore, the FLQ also produced panic among the English-speaking minority. Out of the panic some Anglophones came to understand the urgent need to solve the long smoldering problems and decide to integrate with the majority by learning French and accommodating French institutions. Others became more prejudiced toward the French Canadian majority. Still others, fearing that they might be the next victims or lose economic prosperity, left the province.

**Conclusion**

In the final analysis, the nature and structure of the FLQ made it impossible to eliminate the group completely. It was as much a state of mind as an organization. Any group of dissatisfied Québécois could carry out a bombing spree, a kidnapping, or murder in the name of the FLQ. Many of the guns and much of the dynamite stolen three decades ago have not been recovered and many activ-

ists and sympathizers have been convicted. The stream of Québécois societal disaffection and few terrorist acts have been essentially political ones. In the meantime, conditions that facilitated separatism for would-be freedom fighters have worsened.

The FLQ case represents a cautionary tale about the need for caution in applications to understand contemporary politics and crime.

**Notes**

1. The author uses Seleka to describe how terrorism will subsume the FLQ.
2. The author ignores some factors that are constant throughout the analysis.
3. The report was newsworthy, and the 1970 issue of Perspectives on Crime was released during August 1970.
4. Factors of death and injury that are not typical of the FLQ. First, only two people died from a bomb that exploded prematurely in November 1971, the paper being killed (Shaw, 1975, page 27). Second, the variable was not considered.
5. Factors of death and injury that are typical of the FLQ. First, only two people died from a bomb that exploded prematurely in November 1971, the paper being killed (Shaw, 1975, page 27). Second, the variable was not considered.
6. During the early 1970s, the Canadian government placed pressure on Cuba to sign a treaty. The Canadian government did so to prevent Cuba from continuing to support the FLQ. This was largely due to the events of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Canadian government was concerned about the possibility of a Cuban nuclear weapons program that could be used to support the FLQ.
7. Another factor comments between Canada and France. In 1975, Cuba concluded a treaty with France, which was seen as a major setback for the FLQ. This treaty allowed Cuba to import advanced military technology and equipment that the FLQ could use.
ists and sympathizers have avoided detection. Some have slipped into the mainstream of Québécois society never to be active again. Others under the right circumstances may resort to the once familiar practices of terrorism. Since 1972, few terrorist acts have been carried out in the name of the FLQ. The reasons are essentially political ones. Québec separatism has legitimate outlets and real accomplishments, conditions that have for now eliminated the appeal of violent separatism for would-be terrorists and their larger political audience.

The FLQ case represents one of a series of cases that demonstrate how factors involved in causation of terrorism mirror those of decline. This research has applications to understanding the cyclical nature of terrorism and other forms of political violence and crime.

Notes

1. The author uses Schmid's (1983) definition of terrorism. All further references to terrorism will subsume the political and oppositional dimensions.

2. The author ignores modernization, type of political system, and location, as these factors are constant throughout the period of Québécois separatist terrorism under analysis.

3. The report was never specific, but it was probably the Weathermen.

4. The story was reported by reporter Pierre Nadeau and printed in the August 15, 1970 issue of Perspectives. Nadeau had met the two while making a film in Jordan during August 1970.

5. Factors of death and group disintegration were not very important in the decline of the FLQ. First, only two members of the FLQ were killed. One died after planting a bomb that exploded prematurely (July 1966). Another was assassinated in Paris (March 1971). Second, the variable of group disintegration is an outcome of the former processes.

6. During the early 1970s, security measures were increased at major airports across Canada. This was largely in response to international hijackings and some domestic skyjackings of a nonpolitical nature. Some of these measures included more X-ray baggage-screening devices, the replacement of hand-held metal detectors with walk-through scanning devices, an increase in the number of RCMP officers, and the installation of more and better fencing around airports. While it is impossible to know just how many potential hijackers may have been thwarted, a few people were charged with illegal possession of guns and airport waste baskets yielded a number of guns discarded by passengers who decided not to risk discovery at the check points (Emerson, Toronto Star, 1975, page unknown). For a review of the events of the October Crisis, see, for example, Breton (1973).

7. Another factor contributing to the decline of the FLQ was the international agreements between Canada and other states. For example, on February 15, 1973 Canada and Cuba concluded a treaty to combat aircraft hijackings. The treaty gave each country a choice if a skyjacker lands on their territory either to send him/her back or to prosecute (Globe and Mail, February 15, 1973, p. 1). Finally, on July 17, 1978 the leaders of Canada, Britain, France, Italy, Japan, West Germany, and the United States reached an agreement to cut off commercial airline service to or from any country that harbors hijackers.

8. See Canada (1987) for a review of current international arrangements and coop-
eration, extradition treaties, changes in domestic federal law, development of special emergency response teams, the federal government’s counter- and antiterrorism establishment, and changes in immigration policies and practices.

9. “Operation Olympics” was one of the most extensive security operations in Canadian history. This joint force project performed several functions such as compiling dossiers on potential terrorists at home and abroad (Martin, Globe and Mail, March 24, 1976, p. 2), questioning hundreds of Québécois in the last few weeks before the games, blocking dozens of roads at the Canadian–U.S. border which did not have customs or immigration officers, and installing electronic sensors and infrared devices to spot people crossing the border illegally on foot. In addition, these security measures were bolstered by an antiterrorist patrol along the borders of Ontario, Québec, and New Brunswick (Canadian Press, Globe and Mail, March 1, 1976, p. 8), and close to 16,000 combined police and security forces were mobilized at the games (Martin, Globe and Mail, October 28, 1975, p. 1). These security measures may have prevented a terrorist event at the Olympics. According to U.S. Customs Commissioner Vernon Acree, his service apprehended seven terrorists and a number of gun smugglers at border points during the games (Hall, Toronto Star, July, 8, 1976).

10. The return of several FLQ members to Canada helped quell the FLQ. At the end of 1971, Louise Lancot and Jacques Cossette-Trudel, who were living in Cuba, rejected what they called “FLQism” and in a letter dated August 24, 1972 they said that they had left the FLQ. On November 15, 1976 the PQ won the provincial election on a platform that promised a referendum on Quebec’s constitutional future. After the election most of the FLQ exiles returned home. The first to return home were Lancot and Cossette-Trudel, who arrived in Montreal on December 13, 1978. They were sentenced to 2 years and released after 8 months. On January 14, 1979 Pierre Charrette and Alain Allard returned to Montreal from Cuba. They were sentenced to 6 months for bomb attacks carried out in 1968. On May 25, 1981 Marc Carbonneau returned from Paris and was sentenced to 20 months in jail and 150 hours of community work. Yves Langlois returned to Montreal from Paris on June 9, 1982 and was sentenced to 2 years.

References


