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# Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards a Causal Model*

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The most prominent causes of oppositional political terrorism can be explained by three categories of theories: structural, psychological, and rational choice. While structural variables are most abundant, and much easier to operationalize and measure than psychological or rational choice factors, they have rarely been integrated into a causal model. Those models and theories that incorporate structural variables, however, suffer from a number of problems. The author analyzes these shortcomings then develops an original model through an examination of a complex array of structural factors descriptive of and associated with the dynamics of terrorism. To this end, the author looks at theories of terrorism, case studies of countries that have experienced terrorism, and movements that consistently relied on the use of terrorism to achieve their political objectives. The resultant factors are integrated into categories, and propositions concerning interactions are presented. Then a sketch of a general structural causal model of the conditions of terrorism is posited. The model is a better foundation for qualitative and quantitative analysis of the causes of terrorism.

## 1. Introduction

Over the past quarter of a century there has been an increase in the amount of oppositional political terrorism.[1] This phenomenon stimulated a large amount of research. One of the contested terrains is over the causes of terrorism. This subfield is dominated by case studies of particular countries (e.g. Romano, 1983), regions (e.g. Welfing, 1979), terrorist groups (e.g. Bell, 1971a), individual terrorists (e.g. Smith, 1976), analyses of separate causes (e.g. Grabosky, 1979), and occasionally attempts to create more extensive theories (e.g. Gross, 1972).

Specifically, there is some dispute over which method is the best way to understand the causes of terrorism;[2] the quality of the analyses;[3] and the hidden agendas of causation studies.[4] Moreover, none of the causes identified are mutually exclusive; all approaches to the study of the causes of terrorism borrow concepts from each other. For example, analyses of specific causes often derive their processes from case studies. Case studies use concepts found in studies of

specific causes, and attempts to develop comprehensive theories develop their postulates from case studies and analyses of individual causes.[5] Thus, over the years several causes for the occurrence of terrorism have been presented.

The most prominent causes in this literature fall into three categories: structural, psychological, and rational choice.[6] In general, structural theories posit that the causes of terrorism can be found in the environment and the political, cultural, social, and economic structure of societies.[7] Psychological theories try to specify and explain why individuals join terrorist organizations; terrorist group dynamics; and, how participants (i.e. terrorists, victims, and audiences) affect the commission of terrorist acts. Finally, rational choice theories attempt to explain participation in terrorist organizations and the choice of terrorist actions as a result of the cost benefit calculations of the participants.[8] Of the three, the structural causes are the easiest to test, but have rarely been integrated into a comprehensive causal model that would serve as the foundation for testing.

The purpose of this article is to construct a tentative model of the structural causes of terrorism to help researchers develop and test the relative importance of previously

identified causes and their interactions to determine the scope, intensity, and amount of terrorism. A causal model using the structural variables of terrorism would specify the dominant processes by which this form of political behavior takes place. This model does not preclude the possibility that the final decision which individual terrorists or groups make to engage in terrorism could not be adequately explained by psychological and/or rational choice theories, it is only a practical research strategy. To this end, Hopple (1982, p. 86) suggests that a causal model of terrorism should be created, hypothesized which type of variables could be included, and concluded that a plausible first generation model of terrorism would have two independent variables, internal (intra societal) and external (interstate and systemic), and one dependent variable, transnational terrorism. He advises restricting the model to one of the categories of terrorism.

The structural causes are ideal starting points for a model of the kind that Hopple recommends, for it is much easier to operationalize and measure structural variables than it is for psychological or rational choice ones. Also, it is assumed that the greater the specificity of the variables and their interactions that cause terrorism, the better should be the predictive capability of such a causal model. It is hypothesized that the higher the number and intensity of structural causes of terrorism (the independent variables), the higher the number of terrorist acts perpetrated by any particular terrorist or terrorist organization (the dependent variable). If these variables are causally related, then the systematic elimination or lessening of them should lead to a decrease in terrorism. Knowledge of this kind would be useful to actors involved in counterterrorist measures.

## 2. Limitations

Beyond the limitation of this model to structural factors, three other conceptual compromises are made in order to make the scope more manageable. First, a potentially contentious issue is whether the causes of political violence, in general, are also the causes of terrorism.[9] According to Gurr (1970, p. 11), terrorism is a method of political violence that is subsumed under conspiracy, together with mutinies, coups d'état, political assassinations, and small-scale guerrilla wars. It follows then that causes for both terrorism and political violence must be similar or the same. Likewise, some theorists argue that there is little difference between terrorism and guerrilla warfare, and, consequently, little variation between the causes of guerrilla warfare and those of terrorism (Hyams, 1975, ch. 11). Others see terrorism as one of many tactics used by guerrillas (Wilkinson, 1974, pp. 79–80). Debray, for example, acknowledges the importance of urban terrorism in guerrilla warfare but accords it a role of limited value to the fundamental struggle (1967, p. 74). Meanwhile, guerrilla warfare practitioners and theorists (e.g. Guevara, 1963; Mao-Tse-Tung, 1976) disapproved of the use of terrorism as a tactic in guerrilla warfare. Still, others see terrorism as a unique phenomenon and not a subspecies of guerrilla warfare (Laqueur, 1977, pp. 178–187). While the debate over whether the causes of political violence in general are the causes of terrorism has not been resolved, for the purposes of this study, only the literature specifically concerning the causes of terrorism is reviewed.

Second, terrorism is a type of political crime, thus theories of crime causation are relevant. By the same token there are no generally accepted causal theories of crime, and in particular, political crime. Nevertheless, some of the general structural factors associated with crime causation can be integrated into a model of the structural causes of terrorism.

Third, some conceptual questions about the nature of terrorism must be resolved before proceeding. There is a considerable debate over the most useful definition of terrorism. In general, and following from Schmid's conceptualization (1983), terrorism is defined as a method of combat in which random or symbolic victims are targets of violence. Through previous use of violence or the credible threat of violence,

other members of that group or class are put in a state of chronic fear. The victimization of the target is considered extranormal by most observers, which, in turn, creates an audience beyond the target of terror. The purpose of terrorism is either to immobilize the target of terror in order to produce disorientation and/or compliance, or to mobilize secondary targets of demands (e.g. government) or targets of attention (e.g. public opinion) (p. 100). Although this definition has both advantages and disadvantages (e.g. Schmid & Jongman, 1988, pp. 1–32), it will be used here with some modifications (Ross & Gurr, 1989, pp. 406–407).

## 3. Method

Having established a working definition of terrorism, and clarified conceptual vagaries, it is wise to consider the methodology. First, attempts to develop inclusive theories of causes of terrorism were analyzed. These yielded a number of relevant factors but were weak in explanatory power. Second, studies commenting on the causes of terrorism were reviewed in order to factor out those processes theorists consider important in explaining the causes of terrorism. Third, case studies on the causes for the development of terrorism in various countries were examined. Fourth, case studies on the development of terrorist organizations and movements that have committed a substantial amount of terrorism and consistently relied on the use of terrorism to achieve their political objectives in those countries were examined. Fifth, analyses of individual causal factors were examined. Finally, all appropriate causes were integrated into easily understandable categories, propositions specified, and developed into a comprehensive, but tentative, causal model.

## 4. Previous Theories

Few researchers have developed a general causal model or theory of the structural causes of terrorism. More common are studies that list several possible factors, but fail to specify the interactions among them.

However, there are five well known attempts to create or test theories and models of terrorism, or explain the processes of terrorism that merit attention (e.g. Crenshaw, 1981; Gross, 1972; Hamilton, 1978; Johnson, 1982; Targ, 1979, ch. 8).

These researchers have produced an important and necessary knowledge base from which to conduct further study. Among their accomplishments are the development of models on the causes and sequences of terrorism (e.g. Gross, Hamilton); identification of processes which are contributing and sufficient (Gross); identification of important causal variables; specification of factors important in the stages of terrorism (i.e. Crenshaw, Johnson); development of a typology of causes (i.e. Crenshaw, Johnson); deduction of factors from more general theories of conflict (e.g. Hamilton); specification and empirical testing of relationships among some of the variables (e.g. Hamilton); and, the description of individual factors in a historical context (i.e. Targ).

Merits aside, these works suffer from a series of general problems. Some of these drawbacks are endemic to this type of research, while others are the result of flawed methodologies and unclear conceptions. First, superficial treatments of the subject matter, including insufficient, selective, or superficial review of the literature are common to some of these works. Second, others make no distinction among the different types of terrorism; that is, case studies of state terrorism are not separated from those of oppositional terrorism. There is also some noticeable difficulty in explaining the causes of terrorism before the 1960s. Third, conceptual messiness is created by confusing psychological causes of terrorism with structural factors. The problem is compounded when causes of terrorism are derived from the theories of guerrilla warfare strategists rather than from empirical evidence of terrorist events. Processes by which terrorism is conceived and carried out are also inadequately explained. Many authors simply list the possible causes of terrorism, but fail to note which factor(s) affect them and which are hierarchically more im-

portant than others, as well their findings are not generalizable beyond a particular country, or historical period. Finally, inappropriate data (i.e. Gurr, 1966) are used to test the model. It is possible, however, to maximize the benefits of this previous work on the causes of terrorism by minimizing the shortcomings. This can be accomplished by, for example, specifying the causal relationships between the dependent and independent variables.

## 5. Political Terrorism

The previously mentioned definition may be sufficient for most research, but it is not enough for a model of the structural causes of terrorism. In order to improve this definition, the dependent variable, terrorism, must be conceptualized more clearly. That is, terrorism must be measured in terms of three levels of measurement; its scope, intensity, and amount (frequency). Only then may a tentative causal model claim to be comprehensive. Such a model must be able to explain why certain types of independent variables lead only to low levels of terrorist violence (e.g. embassy takeovers), while others lead to higher amounts of terrorism (e.g. bombings).

Adding to the complexity of the model is the fact that there are several different types of oppositional terrorism (i.e. domestic, international, state-sponsored). Thus, each type of terrorism should have a different pattern of causation and the importance of each variable varies according to the type of terrorist act and group. The pattern of terrorism would also differ among countries and time periods.

## 6. The Structural Causes

### 6.1 Introduction

After reviewing the literature, ten structural causes of terrorism are delineated. In general, most of these factors act as independent variables while at other times they can act as dependent variables, in causal ordering. Following Crenshaw's distinction, these causes may be divided into permissive

and precipitant causes.[10] In the model proposed here, the three permissive causes are hypothesized to be from least to most important: *Geographical Location*, *Type of Political System*, and *Level of Modernization*. And the seven precipitants are hypothesized to be from least to most important: *Social*, *Cultural*, *and Historical Facilitation*, *Organizational Split and Development*, *Presence of Other Forms of Unrest*, *Support*, *Counterterrorist Organization Failure*, *Availability of Weapons and Explosives*, and *Grievances*.

Acts of terrorism may be caused by individuals alone or as members of a group, regardless of the complexity of the command structure and the size of the organization. The model is general enough to accommodate all of these organizational contexts. The proposed relationships among the previously outlined variables are diagrammed in Figure 1.

### 6.2 Permissive Causes

At the core of the precipitant causes are the permissive factors which are endemic to all societies. These can also be thought of as deeper systemic conditions that prestructure and facilitate the presence of the precipitants. Geographical Location, Type of Political System, and Level of Modernization are necessary but not sufficient interacting permissive conditions for terrorism.

### 6.2.1. Geographical Location

Cities are more likely than rural environments to facilitate terrorism. Urban environments allow terrorists several advantages over countrysides (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 382; Grabosky, 1979; Wilkinson, 1977, pp. 61–62): logistic superiority, support, and recruits. Logistic advantages include better fields of fire, closer proximity to and more soft and hard targets, more resources (e.g. banks which are robbed), larger availability of weapons, explosives, secure anonymity, a greater immediate audience, higher and quicker access to the media, ease of surprise and speed, greater number of people to be affected, and ease of kidnappings. Another urban advantage is support (materially and technologically) from sympathizers who

Fig. 1. The General Pattern of Causation among the Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism



may aid terrorist organizations. Finally, a city offers various potential sources from which to recruit new members; including the barrios, ghettos, slums, shanty towns and universities.

Proposition PER1: The higher the population of a city, the greater the amount of terrorism.

PER1a: The higher the percentage of a country's population that is urbanized, the greater the amount of terrorism that the country should experience.

PER1b: The larger the city, the greater the probability of counterterrorist organizations' failure.

PER1c: The larger the population, the greater the opportunity for support.

PER1d: The larger the population, the greater the availability of weapons and explosives.

PER1e: The larger the population, the greater the presence of grievances.

PER1f: The larger the city, the higher the

probability that there will be other forms of unrest.

### 6.2.2 *Type of Political System*

Oppositional terrorism flourishes primarily in prosperous democracies (Gurr, 1979; Hamilton, 1978; Turk, 1982). It is not as common, or as enduring, in lesser developed nation-states, and it is quite uncommon in authoritarian and totalitarian left and right-wing dominated countries. In general, the lion's share of terrorism takes place in democracies due to the strengths and limitations of this type of political system.

A number of reasons may account for this state of affairs: the legacy of a colonial or semicolonial past that has not been adequately resolved (e.g. Great Britain in Northern Ireland); nationalist, separatist, and ethnic conflicts that cannot be easily resolved (e.g. Basques in Spain); accessibility of victims by foreign terrorism (e.g. Al Fatah attacks in France); guarantees of fun-

damental civil liberties promoting freedom of movement, access to media, and the free expression of unrest and dissent thereby accommodating diverse political values and demands (e.g. Gurr, 1979, p. 43), as well as encouraging the proliferation of narrow-based social issues; and, the existence of police forces which are generally law-abiding. These factors are rarely found in or safeguarded in other types of political system.

By the same token, democracies have regularized guarantees and methods of political expression so that dissenters may express their policy preferences or seek redress and accommodation. These checks serve as a normative reminder to potential terrorists that an alternative political strategy must be explored before they engage in violent actions.

Proposition PER2: The greater the degree of democracy, the higher the toleration for terrorism.

PER2a: The greater the amount of democracy, the higher the support for terrorism.

PER2b: The greater the level of democracy, the higher the presence of other forms of unrest.

PER2c: The greater the amount of democracy, the higher the probability of counterterrorist organization failure.

PER2d: The greater the level of democracy, the higher the availability of weapons and explosives.

### 6.2.3 *Level of Modernization*

Modern societies, the most important of the permissive factors, produce several factors that encourage terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 381; Johnson, 1982, pp. 163–166). Six of these factors include: a variety, better, more sophisticated, vulnerable targets, destructive weapons and technology, mass media, populations with increased literacy, conflicts with traditional ways of life, and networks of transportation. Modern societies encompass urban environments and lead to pressures that frequently encourage the establishment of democratic political systems. In general, modern societies are causally prior to democracy because they press for democratic changes (e.g. Huntington, 1968).

Proposition PER3: The more modern the nation-state, the higher the probability that there will be more cities.

PER3a: The more modern the society, the higher the probability it will be democratic or there will be pressures for democratic institutions.

PER3b: The greater the amount of modernization, the higher the number of grievances.

PER3c: The greater the amount of modernization, the higher the social, cultural, and historical facilitation.

### 6.3  *Precipitant Causes*

#### 6.3.1  *Social, Cultural, and Historical Facilitation*

Social, cultural, and historical facilitation consists of shared attitudes, beliefs, opinions, values, customs, habits, myths, and traditions that permit the development of nationalism, fanaticism, violence and terrorism in a subgroup of a population (e.g. Crenshaw, 1981, p. 382; Wilkinson, 1974, p. 96). This facilitation may reinforce the perception that the risks of committing terrorist actions are relatively small; have an inspirational effect which leads to imitation; increase a member's commitment to the group; expose societies to information that will inspire and justify an individual's or group's use of violence; supply discontented individuals or organizations with enough technological knowledge and ideological justification to support their use of terrorism; provide the inspiration needed to cause a contagion of similar events elsewhere in the world (Redlick, 1979; Midlarsky et al., 1980); or mitigate such phenomena as doctrinal debates and factionalization, defections, fear, and growing resistance to leaders' demands and political strictures.

Terrorist leaders, theoreticians and members, the cultural and intellectual elite, journalists, as well as other forms of social control can expose, communicate, or inculcate shared social, cultural, and historical norms through four major channels: the alternative and mass media; higher edu-

cation; international travel; and dissemination of intellectual knowledge. Alternatively, social, cultural, and historical precedents may be reinforced by naming terrorist cells after members who have died or people who rebelled under similar circumstances in the past, and committing actions on the anniversaries of past events which were significant to the group. These processes not only encourage terrorists to draw connections among otherwise random circumstances, but symbolize the continuity of their struggle, and increase the terrorist organization's solidarity.

Thus, if the organization or group has a political ideology advocating violence then there should be a higher motivation to act upon this dictate. Social, cultural, and historical facilitation leads to support, organizational split, and development, and may lead to the failure of counterterrorist practices.

Proposition PRE1: The longer an identifiable subgroup exists within a dominant majority, the greater its tendency to develop grievances.

PRE1a: The higher the social, cultural, and historical facilitation, the greater the propensity of members of that community to use terrorism.

PRE1b: The higher the social, cultural, and historical facilitation, the greater the support of terrorism.

PRE1c: The higher the social, cultural, and historical facilitation, the greater the tendency for its members to split from a more moderate organization.

### 6.3.2 *Organizational Development or Split*
Most terrorist groups come into existence as the 'result of a split between the moderate and the more extreme wings of an already-existing organization' (e.g. political party) (Laqueur, 1977, p. 103). Sometimes organizational splits create a rivalry within and among terrorist organizations that can lead to clashes among the various groups, which in turn reduces their effective power (Laqueur, 1977, p. 104). At other times, an organizational split that leads to the creation of a terrorist group may create more terror-

ism. Both established and offspring organizations are motivated to demonstrate their willingness to engage in terrorism by competing for resources (including recruits) and proving to their presumed or actual constituency that they are serious about their goals. Regardless of the outcomes, organizational development or split leads to support of terrorism and grievances held by populations.

Proposition PRE2: The more terrorist organizations split, the higher the probability that one or more of them will advocate and use terrorism.

PRE2a: The higher the number of political and terrorist organizations that split, the greater the probability that one or more will support terrorism.

### 6.3.3 *Presence of Other Forms of Political Unrest*
The presence of other forms of unrest among populations, violent or non-violent, may act as a catalyst for terrorism. These forms of unrest include war, revolution, guerrilla warfare, strikes, protests, demonstrations, riots, or other group terrorist actions. Unrest can motivate terrorist organizations; provide learning opportunities; increase the legitimacy of violent actions; and, heighten a sense of grievance. Both unrest inside or outside nation-state boundaries may influence individuals and organizations to commit terrorism. Generally, the closer the proximity of unrest, the higher the likelihood that it will act as a catalyst for terrorism. Presence of other forms of unrest is promoted when there is a communication mechanism that relays this information to disgruntled populations (e.g. contagion). Other forms of political unrest can also heighten grievances and lead to organizational splits and development.

Proposition PRE3: The greater the presence of other forms of political unrest, the higher the likelihood that grievances by subgroups will be identified and acted on.

PRE3a: The greater the presence of other forms of political unrest, the higher the social, cultural, and historical facilitation among groups expressing grievances.

PRE3b: The higher the amount of other forms of political unrest, the greater the likelihood there will be counterterrorist organization failure.

### 6.3.4 *Support*

Support from a variety of actors facilitates terrorism (Cline & Alexander, 1984; Clutterbuck, 1986; Laqueur, 1977, pp. 110–116; Sterling, 1981). Support may be in the form of: finances, training, intelligence, false documents, donations or sales of weapons and explosives, provisions of sanctuary or safe housing, propaganda campaigns, ideological justification, public opinion, legal services, and a constant supply of recruits.

Some of the sources from which terrorist organizations receive support either directly or indirectly are: other members of the aggrieved population (i.e. bystanders and activists),[11] states, national security organizations,[12] individual terrorists, terrorist and guerrilla organizations, organized crime groups, the media,[13] emigrant populations, philanthropists, academics, and professionals.

The main reason these organizations give support to terrorists is to further the goals of the terrorists or to promote their own goals. Support of the group leads to the availability of weapons and explosives, antiterrorist organizations' failure, and grievances. Thus, as sources of support, resources, and political objectives change, so should their support.

Proposition PRE4: The higher the amount of support, the greater the amount of counterterrorist failures.

PRE4a: The higher the amount of support, the greater the availability of weapons and explosives.

### 6.3.5 *Counterterrorist Organization Failure*

The failure of police, military, intelligence services, prisons, private security companies, and the government in general, to detect, prevent, combat, hereafter control, terrorism may provoke, maintain, and encourage terrorism.[14] Problems common to most organizations – creation, allocation of resources, efficiency, enforcement, im-

plementation, performance, and sufficiency – may paralyze antiterrorist agencies.

More specifically, counterterrorist organizations' inability to control terrorism is related to failures to: (1) develop an organization to monitor terrorist events and groups; (2) obtain sufficient resources. Extremist clandestine organizations that advocate and use terrorism make the task of antiterrorist organizations more difficult because limited state resources weaken the effectiveness of counterterrorist organizations; (3) deter terrorists by not increasing the risks for terrorists and people who might join or support them. This failure is due to lack of, or insufficient, practices and policies such as new antiterrorist laws (national and international), penalties, surveillance, legislation that defines specific terrorist tactics as offenses, prosecution of incarcerated terrorists, extradition treaties, publicizing the development of state antiterrorist squads, tactics and technology, and counterterrorist policies and tactics; (4) maintain the semblance of democracy by increasing authoritarianism, including stifling dissent, suspending or abrogating civil liberties, and profuse controls on media coverage, including press censorship; (5) detect terrorists, by not using infiltration, surveillance/intelligence techniques, as well as by cultivating informers, using old antiterrorist technology, and intimidating suspected sympathizers into becoming informers; (6) pre-empt terrorists by making it impossible for them to act, including inadequately hardening targets, imprisoning or killing terrorists, not creating antiterrorist agencies, or engaging in antiterrorist tactics, including making it more difficult for terrorists to buy, receive, and construct weapons, and prevent infiltration, cultivation of sources, and escapes from or attacks on prisons in which terrorists are incarcerated;[15] and, (7) make organizational changes, including education of personnel, decreasing the populace's toleration of terrorism, development of antiterrorist squads, improvement of antiterrorist technology and tactics, and improving jurisdiction, authority, cooperation, and coordination with other agencies, strengthen agencies charged with antiterror-

ist functions, including inability to mount propaganda campaigns against terrorist organizations and coordinate activities among counterterrorist agencies.

In short, failures of antiterrorist organizations enable terrorist agencies to acquire weapons and explosives, they may increase oppositional grievances and encourage support of terrorist organizations by various populations.

Proposition PRE5: The greater the number of antiterrorist organization failures, the higher the amount of terrorism.

PRE5a: The greater the number of counterterrorist organization failures, the higher the probability that some of these organizations will facilitate the availability of weapons and explosives to terrorist groups.

PRE5b: The more the amount of antiterrorist organization failures, the greater the amount of support for terrorist organizations.

### 6.3.6 *Availability of Weapons and Explosives*

The availability of weapons, explosives, and composite materials, or the knowledge needed to build them are important results of the failure of antiterrorist organizations to deter terrorism. Terrorists have had very few problems obtaining weapons and explosives (Hippchen & Yim, 1982). These weapons, explosives, and composite materials can be obtained in four ways: purchases, gifts, theft, or construction. Most terrorists have been able to purchase them legally in their own country. Some weapons are bought or given in, from, or through the previously mentioned typical sources of support. Some weapons and explosives are stolen from gun and sporting goods stores, military arsenals or police stations. Money to purchase weapons, explosives, and composite materials is obtained through criminal activities such as bank robbery, fraud, hostage-taking, extortion, or received from common sources of support.

Explosives as well as information on the construction of bombs are also readily available. Gasoline for making Molotov cocktails is available commercially or may be siphoned out of a vehicle's gas tank. Dynamite is usually stolen from construction sites, mines, and quarries. And information on bomb construction is located in a plethora of publicly available books and often disseminated through terrorist produced publications. Availability of weapons and explosives most directly leads to support of such activities; no one wants to back a powerless organization. Counterterrorist organization failures, on the other hand, can affect the weapons and explosives that terrorists choose. Other factors include the liberal gun possession laws of some countries (e.g. United States) and perhaps the availability of weapons and explosives because a particular country has recently endured a civil war (e.g. Afghanistan, Lebanon) where the presence of guns and explosives in these societies is high.

Proposition PRE6: The higher the availability of weapons and explosives in a country, the greater the amount of terrorism.

PRE6a: The higher the availability of weapons and explosives, the greater the likelihood of counterterrorist organization failure.

### 6.3.7 *Grievances*

Grievances, both actual and perceived, putative and general, are hypothesized to be the most important variable. Grievances, commonly the result of coercion, discrimination, oppression and repression often against an identifiable subgroup of a larger population (e.g. minorities, elites, etc.) can lead to terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 383; Gurr, 1990; Hamilton, 1978). Grievances leading to terrorism can be divided into seven categories: economic, ethnic, racial, legal, political, religious, and social. Economic grievances include poverty, exploitation, expropriation, indebtedness, and unemployment. Ethnic, racial, and religious grievances may take the form of discrimination (e.g. Dutter, 1987; Turk, 1982, p. 125). Legal grievances can involve suspension of civil liberties, banning of political parties, censorship and antiterrorist laws. Other grievances include police surveillance, police brutality, breakdown in

dialogue between governments and oppositions, government (official) insensitivity, disregard of oppositional input, and frustrated access to the news media (e.g. Hamilton, 1978, p. 66).

Grievances are directed against a variety of individuals, groups, organizations, classes, races, and ethnicities, both public and private (e.g. the government, businesses, unions, military, police, religious organizations, political parties). Grievances unheeded can lead to the development of a social movement, interest group, political party, or in extreme cases an individual, cell, group or organization that engages in terrorist actions. Alternatively, in a non-violent organization, the intensification of grievances or lack of success in obtaining the group's objectives may lead to organizational splits, and the development of different organizational levels that engage in terrorism. Finally, grievances can lead to support of terrorism. A third party, aware of the grievances, may seize an opportunity for influence by giving support to likely candidates who would engage in terrorism. Presence of other forms of unrest, social, cultural, and historical facilitation, and organizational split and development, heighten the intensity of already felt grievances.

Proposition PRE7: The greater the number of grievances, the higher the amount of terrorism.

PRE7a: The higher the number of grievances, the greater the support of terrorism.

PRE7b: The higher the amount of grievances, the higher the number of organizational splits and development.

### 6.4 Summary
Unmistakably, structural factors interact with each other to cause terrorism. In general, the permissive causes structure the type and amount of precursors to a group's choice of terrorism, which is facilitated by interdependent precipitant causes. While all of the seven precipitants may motivate individuals or groups to choose terrorism to obtain their goals, typically the pattern is more complex. For example, grievances can lead to support, support may lead to grievances or the availability of weapons and explosives, counterterrorist organization failure can lead to support, and organizational split and development may lead to grievances.

### 7. Conclusion
Causal modeling of the type developed here should be regarded as an iterative process. First generation causal models in a field of inquiry such as terrorism, which is descriptively rich but analytically barren, will provide the foundation for future and more complex models. In order to make a preliminary test of the propositions of this model, researchers should choose a methodology that would allow for the comparative testing of these processes. At a minimum, the history of at least three different terrorist organizations/movements tested through a most different systems design should be studied.[16] Testing should also be done with all types of oppositional terrorism (e.g. domestic, international/transnational, and state-sponsored). More sophisticated generations of the model would include psychological and rational choice theories on causes of terrorism; be placed in the larger context of the literature on the causes of political violence research; have factors better outlined and operationalized and tested quantitatively to determine the strength of these relationships; and, include case studies of nations and groups from non-English reports. Finally, more refined models may be constructed and tested as more evidence accrues on the subject of terrorism. Terrorism has not disappeared, only media reporting of this phenomena has decreased. Increasing separatism and ethnic conflict in the former Communist states and satellites of the Soviet Union and elsewhere will provide an up-to-date laboratory within which to study terrorism well into the 21st century.

NOTES

1. All further references to terrorism will assume both political and oppositional dimensions unless otherwise stated.

2. According to Bell (1971b), it is impossible to create broad general theories to account for the causes of terrorism. He bases this on the fact that 'revolutionary or terrorist movements are emboldened by varying traditions, differing cultural heritages, and special historical conditions' (p. 78). He also feels 'there are too many special cases or else the effective generalizations (sic) are neither particularly profound nor ready of application' (p. 92). Consequently his research focuses on case studies of revolutionary groups. Hopple, on the other hand, feels that case studies 'typically constitute strident "ad hocism" and display a preoccupation with detailed description. The studies which do attempt to develop explanatory or causal accounts generally do so in a vacuum; even systematic comparative case studies are rare' (Hopple, 1982, p. 81).

3. For a criticism of the quality of causal theories of terrorism see Crenshaw (1981, pp. 379–380).

4. Mitchell (1985, p. 17, fn. 32) suggests that: 'While the search for causation may be interpreted as "theoretical" in its broadest sense, the hidden agenda of much of this work is to delegitimize the use of the terrorist strategy for political purposes. A serious effort to ascertain the "cause" of terrorism would necessitate a much higher standard of objectivity and scientific rigor than has hitherto been shown. Much of the work on causation has the outward appearance of theory but in fact utilizes an inductive rather than deductive approach.'

5. Romano makes a similar point. She says that 'often one cause overlaps another or several causes' (1984, p. ix).

6. Reilly (1973) makes the same point with regard to internal war. Romano (1984) divides the causes into the biological, psychiatric and sociological schools; Mitchell (1985) identifies ideologies, the environment, and individual factors; Turk (1989) looks at criminological approaches to terrorism; and Keenan (1987) outlines the sociological and psychological.

7. A considerable debate exists over the concept of structuralism. For purposes of this article, structuralism is a method of inquiry. 'The principal feature of the structuralist method is that it takes as its object of investigation a system that is, the reciprocal relations among a set of facts, rather than particular facts considered in isolation; its basic concepts according to Piaget are those of totality, self-regulation and transformation' (Bottomore, 1983, p. 469). And social structure refers to 'the patterns discernible in social life, the regularities observed, [and] the configurations detected. But the nature of the patterns and shapes one can recognize in the welter of human experience depends on one's perspective' (Blau, 1975, p. 3). Another debate exists between whether or not social structure refers to empirical reality to observable groups and hierarchies dividing a population (the British School as articulated by Radcliffe-Brown and his students) and social structure as a mental construct devised by theorists to explain empirical observation and only roughly reflected in the various empirically observed patterns of social positions and relations (Levi-Strauss and his students).

8. Rational choice theories can be subsumed under psychological theories if one conceptualizes it as a motivational theory.

9. Sometimes referred to as the embedding theory.

10. Others have used direct and indirect causes.

11. Political support in the wider community for the terrorist's acts and objectives may prevent terrorists from antagonizing previously neutral and disinterested groups and from alienating many of the people on the part of whom they claim to act.

12. Several countries have been blamed for supporting terrorist organizations: the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Libya. This is more commonly referred to as the 'Conspiracy theory of Terrorism'. Several problems have been raised about the inclusion of certain states as benefactors of terrorism (e.g. Herman, 1982, pp. 64–65; and Schmid, 1983, pp. 210–218). Two major criticisms have been voiced against this cause of terrorism; conclusions based on circumstantial evidence, or faulty reasoning (Bonante, 1979). Additionally, the United States supported Cuban counter-revolutionary groups who engaged in terrorism in the United States. Actions by this group in the United States are state-sponsored terrorism and not domestic terrorism.

13. The mass media have long been cited as a cause of terrorism. The mass media can be used as a propaganda tool, to help terrorists gain publicity, to advertise its grievances, to exaggerate its importance, to create favorable public opinion, to glorify terrorists, to diffuse knowledge about methods, technologies, and success, to provide models for imitation, and to provide information to terrorists especially in assault cases as to the positions of the counterterrorist forces. An alternative theory suggests that access to the media may cause terrorist attacks (Schmid & De Graaf, 1982).

14. A similar but narrower argument is presented in Laqueur (1977) and Crenshaw (1981).

15. Attacks on antiterrorist organizations have enabled terrorists to secure intelligence information, weapons and explosives, the death of security forces, the demoralization of security forces, and freeing of other terrorists.

16. Wilkinson (1979, p. 104) divides terrorist groups into: (1) nationalist, autonomist, or ethnic minority movements; (2) ideological sects or secret societies seeking some form of 'revolutionary' justice or social liberation; (3) exile or emigre groups with irredentist, separatist, or revolutionary aspirations concerning their country of origin; and (4) transnational gangs deploying terrorists and logistic support from two or more countries, usually in the name of some vague 'revolutionary' goal. It should also be noted that like the demarcation of the different types of terrorism (international, state, etc.) there are also overlap effects between the different categories of terrorist groups. For

example, some nationalist/leftist organizations have anarcho/communist elements.

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